Misaligned Lawmaking
Timothy Meyer*
Since 1962, when Congress passed the Trade Expansion Act, every new
U.S. trade deal has had the same essential bargain at its core. Congress agrees
to give the president the power to lower trade barriers, while at the same time
providing adjustment assistance for those workers displaced by competition
with new imports. This bargain illustrates what I refer to as the Misalignment
Thesis: when a legislative bargain is struck over two or more interdependent
policies, the policy subject to more frequent or costlier renegotiation and
implementation will be disfavored in the long run. In the trade context, the
misalignment occurs because trade liberalization commitments are indefinite,
enshrined in international agreements, and implemented by the executive
branch; the adjustment assistance provisions are temporary, purely domestic,
and require renegotiation and reauthorization in Congress.
As a consequence, proponents of policies to help displaced workers must
constantly renegotiate and defend laws to help their constituents. Moreover,
they must do so within an institution, Congress, in which the transaction costs
of securing favorable policy outcomes are very high. The result is that policies
aimed at helping workers displaced by trade liberalization are chronically
undersupplied.
Proponents of trade liberalization, on the other hand, never have to
renegotiate their gains. Each trade agreement goes into the pocket of trade
proponents, and then they move on to securing the next trade agreement. Nor
does Congress maintain a meaningful role in the implementation of trade
agreements. Once an agreement is in effect, implementation is left to the
executive branch, where the transaction costs of enacting a trade-liberalizing
agenda are quite low.
This Article makes three contributions. First, it introduces the
Misalignment Thesis in the context of U.S. trade policy. The Misalignment
Thesis is a descriptive claim about how the structure of a legislative bargain
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influences the long-term stability and effectiveness of that bargain. Second, the
Article introduces the normative corollary to the Misalignment Thesis: if
political stability hinges on respecting the legislative bargain, interdependent
policies should be subject to renegotiation on the same timeline and
implementation on the same terms. In light of this prescription, I offer three
concrete proposals for aligning trade liberalization and trade adjustment
assistance in order to protect and promote the goals of both policies. Most
importantly, I argue—contrary to most commentary—that the Trump
Administration’s proposal to limit the duration of trade agreements like NAFTA
would better align trade liberalization and trade adjustment assistance. Third,
the Article discusses the Misalignment Thesis’s broader application to
deregulatory bargains struck in a wide variety of fields, including
transportation, telecommunications, and healthcare. The Misalignment Thesis
suggests that deregulation often has unintended consequences because the
structure of deregulatory bargains undermines their long-term effectiveness.
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INTRODUCTION
President Trump has made international trade one of the central
policy issues for his Administration.1 In 2018, the Trump
Administration completed tense negotiations with Mexico and Canada
over revisions to the North American Free Trade Agreement
(“NAFTA”).2 The resulting agreement has faced uncertain prospects for
legislative approval in Canada and the United States,3 although further
negotiations in late 2019 appear to have cleared the path for the revised
agreement’s approval in early 2020.4 In March 2018, the United States
completed the renegotiation of the United States–South Korea free
trade agreement (“KORUS”).5 President Trump has also reportedly
mulled withdrawing from the World Trade Organization (“WTO”).6 In
response, the European Union (“EU”) has proposed renegotiating
certain aspects of the WTO to which the United States has long

1.
See, e.g., Andrew Restuccia & Doug Palmer, White House Preparing for Trade Crackdown,
POLITICO (Jan. 8, 2018), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/01/07/trump-trade-crackdown327283 [https://perma.cc/V8CW-3J3A] (“President Donald Trump’s administration is preparing to
unveil an aggressive trade crackdown in the coming weeks that is likely to include new tariffs
aimed at countering China’s and other economic competitors’ alleged unfair trade practices,
according to three administration officials.”)
2.
Alan Rappeport, U.S. and Canada Reach Trade Deal to Salvage Nafta, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
30, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/30/us/politics/us-canada-nafta-deal-deadline.html
[https://perma.cc/7UAU-FV9P].
3.
Mary Beth Sheridan, Mexico Becomes First Country to Ratify New North American Trade
Deal, WASH. POST (June 19, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/mexicobecomes-first-country-to-ratify-usmca-north-american-trade-deal/2019/06/19/500dd8c0-92b311e9-956a-88c291ab5c38_story.html [https://perma.cc/V97Z-CGGZ] (describing the potential
difficulties the new treaty faces in the United States and Canada).
4.
William Mauldin & Natalie Andrews, House Passes North American Trade Pact with
Bipartisan Support, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 19, 2019, 5:46 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/usmcaclears-threshold-to-pass-in-the-house-with-bipartisan-support-11576790200
[https://perma.cc/
Y6CJ-N577].
5.
Tori K. Whiting, Analyzing the Renegotiated U.S.–Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS),
HERITAGE FOUND. 1 (Apr. 13, 2018), https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/201804/IB4838_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/9YYB-TLSS].
6.
Gabriella Muñoz, Trump Mulls Pulling the U.S. Out of the World Trade Organization:
Report, WASH. TIMES (June 29, 2018), https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2018/jun/29/
donald-trump-mulls-pulling-the-us-out-of-the-world/ [https://perma.cc/3QK6-369Y].
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objected,7 while Canada has convened a group of nations to tackle more
comprehensive WTO reform.8
Renegotiating these agreements represents an unprecedented
opportunity—and a huge risk. WTO rules are the foundation of a global
economy that supports millions of jobs worldwide and facilitates
trillions of dollars’ worth of global trade. Canada and Mexico are the
United States’ top trading partners after China, while South Korea is
the United States’ sixth-largest trading partner.9 These three countries
alone accounted for over $1 trillion in goods traded with the United
States in 2016—more than a quarter of the United States’ international
trade in goods.10 Revamping these agreements offers the United States
the opportunity to consider what international trade policy should look
like in the twenty-first century.11 The foundations of that trading
system have remained largely unchanged since the end of the Cold War,
when nations created NAFTA (1994), the WTO (1995), and a raft of
other free trade agreements around the world.12
This Article argues that these renegotiations represent an
opportunity to correct a critical misalignment in trade policy. Since
1962, when Congress passed the Trade Expansion Act, every new U.S.
trade deal has had the same essential bargain at its core.13 Congress
agrees to give the president the power to lower trade barriers, while at
7.
See Philip Blenkinsop, EU Set to Push for WTO Reform to Ease Global Trade Tensions,
REUTERS (June 19, 2018, 8:51 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-trade-wto-eu/eu-set-topush-for-wto-reform-to-ease-global-trade-tensions-idUSKBN1JF1V0
[https://perma.cc/K6V55VVR] (“EU leaders will meet . . . to discuss a range of issues, including . . . trade, which has taken
on added importance after U.S. President Donald Trump imposed important tariffs on EU steel
and aluminum.”).
8.
Canada to Host Meeting on WTO Reform, U.S. and China Left Out for Now, REUTERS
(July 27, 2018, 12:02 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-wto-canada/canada-tohost-meeting-on-wto-reform-u-s-and-china-left-out-for-now-idUSKBN1KH26V [https://perma.cc/
MQF2-2XUN].
9.
Top U.S. Trade Partners, INT’L TRADE ADMIN., https://www.trade.gov/mas/ian/build/
groups/public/@tg_ian/documents/webcontent/tg_ian_003364.pdf (last visited Dec. 26, 2019)
[https://perma.cc/K6F8-BJ7L]. South Korea’s ranking, while listed as seventh by exports, is sixth
by combined value of imports and exports. See id. These statistics measure trade in goods only,
not trade in services or cross-border investments. Id.
10. Id.
11. Renegotiation of the United Kingdom’s trade agreements, necessitated by Brexit, and the
negotiation of new EU trade agreements, offers a similar opportunity for countries around the
world.
12. Other major trade agreements created in the early 1990s include the Treaty of Asuncion,
which created Mercosur, a customs union comprising much of South America, see Treaty
Establishing a Common Market art. 1, Mar. 26, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1041, as well as the Treaty of
Maastricht, which deepened European integration through the creation of the European Union
and laid the foundation for the adoption of the euro as a common currency, see Treaty on European
Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 191) 1.
13. See Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, § 252, 76 Stat. 872, 879–80
(repealed 1974).
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the same time providing assistance for those workers displaced by
competition with new imports. The misalignment occurs because the
trade liberalization commitments are indefinite, enshrined in
international agreements, and implemented by the executive branch;
the assistance provisions are temporary, purely domestic, and require
renegotiation and reauthorization in Congress.
As a consequence, proponents of policies to help displaced
workers must constantly renegotiate and defend laws to help their
constituents. Moreover, they have to do so within an institution,
Congress, in which the transaction costs of implementation are very
high. The result is that policies aimed at helping workers displaced by
trade liberalization are chronically undersupplied.
Proponents of trade liberalization, on the other hand, have not,
until recently, ever had to renegotiate their gains. Each trade
agreement the United States concludes goes into the pocket of free trade
proponents, and then they move on to securing the next trade
agreement. Nor does Congress maintain a meaningful role in the
implementation of trade agreements. Once an agreement is in effect,
implementation is left to the executive branch, where the transaction
costs of enacting a trade-liberalizing agenda are quite low.
This Article introduces the Misalignment Thesis, which explains
this dynamic. The Misalignment Thesis has both a descriptive and a
normative component. The descriptive Misalignment Thesis states that
when a legislative bargain is struck over two or more interdependent
policies, the policy that is subject to more frequent or costlier
renegotiation and implementation will be disfavored in the long run.
The normative corollary is that if political stability hinges on respecting
the legislative bargain, the policies should be subject to renegotiation
on the same timeline and implementation on the same terms.
This misalignment is most evident in situations in which the
government moves from using a single policy instrument to implement
two policy goals to using two separate policy instruments to achieve the
same two goals. I refer to this process as decoupling. As long as only a
single policy instrument is in use, proponents of both policy goals are
ensured a seat at the bargaining table. For example, when the
government seeks to use trade barriers to both promote international
trade and support workers and import-competing industry, proponents
of each of these goals have leverage. When each policy goal has its own
policy instrument, however, the two policies no longer need to be
negotiated together. Consequently, proponents of the more frequently
renegotiated policy instrument may not be able to use support for the
other policy as leverage in negotiations to achieve their primary goal.
They may thus see their policy gains erode over time. This prediction,
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grounded in how the law structures the renegotiation and
implementation of interdependent policies, flies in the face of a
significant body of political and economic thinking that holds that
interdependent policies should be negotiated and implemented
separately for reasons of efficiency.14
I develop the Misalignment Thesis primarily in the context of
U.S. trade policy, although as I explain below it has broad application
to a number of areas in which the federal government has deregulated
the economy. The descriptive Misalignment Thesis, I argue, explains
the current crisis in U.S. trade policy.15 Economists, trade lawyers, and
policymakers have for a long time maintained that trade liberalization
should be achieved through international agreements, and any
redistribution necessary to compensate those harmed by trade
liberalization should be worked out as a matter of domestic law.16 In
significant parts of the developed world, including the United States,
that domestic redistribution has not occurred on the scale necessary to
address the plight of dislocated workers.17 The election of Donald
Trump on a protectionist platform in the United States, British voters’
14. See, e.g., PAUL R. KRUGMAN & MAURICE OBSTFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS: THEORY
POLICY 216 (7th ed. 2005); N. Gregory Mankiw, Why Economists Are Worried About
International Trade, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/16/business/
trump-economists-trade-tariffs.html [https://perma.cc/5PZ9-YP2A] (arguing that dislocations
caused by trade liberalization may require domestic programs, such as a robust social safety net,
but do not undermine the case for trade liberalization); see also Gregory Shaffer, Retooling Trade
Agreements for Social Inclusion, 2019 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (describing and critiquing the “twostep” model of trade policy).
15. It may also have something to say about the similar crisis in Europe, as well as other
deregulatory bargains struck within the United States. See infra Part I. In the interest of space, I
focus here on the experience in U.S. trade policy, deferring to future research the application of
the Misalignment Thesis to other countries and fields.
16. See, e.g., KRUGMAN & OBSTFELD, supra note 14, at 216:
It is always preferable to deal with market failures as directly as possible . . . . Any
proposed trade policy should always be compared with a purely domestic policy aimed
at correcting the same problem. If the domestic policy appears too costly or has
undesirable side effects, the trade policy is almost surely even less desirable . . . .;
Shaffer, supra note 14, at 4 (acknowledging “the trade establishment’s traditional approach of
calling for complementary domestic policy in parallel to trade liberalization,” but arguing it is “no
longer sufficient”); Simon Lester, The Globalization Paradox: Democracy and the Future of the
World Economy, 10 WORLD TRADE REV. 409, 414 (2011) (book review) (“[I]s a 20% tariff on foreign
goods really the best way to protect domestic labor standards?”); see also Timothy Meyer, Saving
the Political Consensus in Favor of Free Trade, 70 VAND. L. REV. 985, 993–97 (2017) (discussing
conventional thinking on the relationship between trade liberalization and domestic
redistribution).
17. See DANI RODRIK, THE GLOBALIZATION PARADOX: DEMOCRACY AND THE FUTURE OF THE
WORLD ECONOMY 18 (2012) (“People demand compensation against risk when their economies are
more exposed to international economic forces . . . .”); Lawrence Summers, A Strategy to Promote
Healthy Globalization, FIN. TIMES (May 4, 2008), https://www.ft.com/content/999160e6-1a0311dd-ba02-0000779fd2ac [https://perma.cc/S77H-VJZM] (“[W]hat is good for the global economy
and its business champions was not necessarily good for [workers] . . . .”).
AND

2020]

MISALIGNED LAWMAKING

157

decision to leave the European Union, and significant electoral support
for antiglobalization candidates and right-wing political parties in
France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden, Austria, Hungary, and the
Netherlands all testify to the inadequacy of government efforts to cope
with the domestic effects of globalization.18 U.S. participation in the
Trans-Pacific Partnership (“TPP”)—a free trade agreement between
twelve nations that President Obama negotiated to establish the “rules
of the road” for twenty-first-century trade—has already been a casualty
of this backlash.19
The Misalignment Thesis posits that the inadequacy of
redistribution is a product of trade law’s domestic architecture in the
United States. The Trade Expansion Act of 1962 decoupled
international trade policy from government support for workers and
import-competing sectors. It did so by creating the Trade Adjustment
Assistance (“TAA”) program, the core component of trade-related
redistribution since 1962.20 The program provides financial aid to
workers, farmers, and firms hurt by competition from imports.21 Yet
precisely because it involves financial aid, TAA creates spending
commitments that Congress must reauthorize from time to time. Not
18. See Auxit, Frexit, Nexit? EU Countries May Hold Referendums Following ‘Brexit’ Vote, RT
NEWS (June 23, 2016, 8:52 PM) https://www.rt.com/viral/348039-brexit-eu-referendum-domino/
[https://perma.cc/XYU8-5YWZ] (“As UK citizens head to the polls for the ‘Brexit’ vote, many are
speculating the move could have a domino effect across Europe.”); Jon Stone, Nearly All EU States
‘Could Follow Britain’s Lead and Leave the Union,’ Senior French MP Warns, INDEPENDENT (Sept.
27, 2016, 4:45 PM), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/brexit-eu-referendumbritain-france-leave-vote-union-a7331426.html
[https://perma.cc/7YVA-BXAU]
(quoting
a
member of the French Parliament as saying that “what happened in the UK at the referendum
could have happened [in] almost every other country in the European Union—except in the other
countries no Prime Minister would have been as irresponsible as to ask for a referendum”); Jan
Eichhorn, Christine Hübner & Daniel Kenealy, The View from the Continent: What People in Other
Member States Think About the UK’s EU Referendum, APPLIED QUANTITATIVE METHODS NETWORK
(2016), https://www.research.aqmen.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/sites/27/2017/07/TheViewFromThe
Continent_REPORT.pdf [https://perma.cc/D3PN-5YDH] (describing the various views of EU
citizens in regard to Brexit).
19. See Nicholas Loffredo, Trump Says Withdrawal From TPP a ‘Great Thing for the
American Worker,’ NEWSWEEK (Jan. 23, 2017, 1:15 PM), https://www.newsweek.com/trumpwithdrawal-tpp-great-thing-american-worker-547109 [https://perma.cc/42RA-5UBZ] (reporting
the Trump Administration’s decision to “act[ ] on a key campaign promise” by withdrawing from
the TPP); Barack Obama, Opinion, The TPP Would Let America, Not China, Lead the Way on
Global Trade, WASH. POST (May 2, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/presidentobama-the-tpp-would-let-america-not-china-lead-the-way-on-global-trade/2016/05/02/680540e40fd0-11e6-93ae-50921721165d_story.html [https://perma.cc/423A-UR3Z] (“As a Pacific power, the
United States has pushed to develop a high-standard Trans- Pacific Partnership, a trade deal that
puts American workers first and makes sure we write the rules of the road for trade in the 21st
century.”).
20. 19 U.S.C. § 2272 (2012).
21. See Stephen Kim Park, Bridging the Global Governance Gap: Reforming the Law of Trade
Adjustment, 43 GEO. J. INT’L L. 797, 799 (2012) (discussing how trade adjustment assistance
works).

158

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:1:151

surprisingly, TAA’s successful reauthorization or extension tends to
coincide with the negotiation of new trade agreements, such as NAFTA
or TPP.22
When new trade negotiations have not been on the table,
however, Congress has cut back on TAA. In 1981, Congress significantly
cut benefits under TAA.23 In 1986, it let the program temporarily
lapse.24 The Reagan Administration proposed abolishing it entirely.25
After a series of short extensions during the Obama Administration, the
program is currently set to expire in 2021.26
Trade agreements suffer no such headwinds. A U.S. trade
agreement remains in force unless and until one state party terminates
it.27 So too does the domestic implementing legislation.28 Consequently,
after Congress has approved a trade agreement, the gains and losses
from trade liberalization are locked in, subject only to the executive’s
willingness to consider using termination or violation as a threat to
spur renegotiation.

22. See Trade Preferences Extension Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-27, 129 Stat. 362 (codified
in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.); North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act,
Pub. L. No. 103-182, 107 Stat. 2057 (1993) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 3301–3437 (2012)).
23. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, §§ 2501–2529, 95 Stat.
357, 881−93 (codified in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.).
24. See J. F. HORNBECK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41922, TRADE ADJUSTMENT ASSISTANCE
(TAA) AND ITS ROLE IN U.S. TRADE POLICY 9 (Aug. 5, 2013), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41922.pdf
[https://perma.cc/64AY-628F] (describing the circumstances leading up to, and following, the
three-month lapse in 1986).
25. Id.
26. § 403, 129 Stat. at 374 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2318(b)(1) (2012)).
27. See, e.g., Free Trade Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic
of Korea, S. Kor.-U.S., art. 24.5, June 30, 2007, (entered into force Mar. 15, 2012) [hereinafter
KORUS], https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/korus-fta/final-text [https://
perma.cc/3XLW-ZVHD]; North American Free Trade Agreement, Can.-Mex.-U.S., art. 2205, Dec.
17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].
28. See United States-Korea Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 112-41,
§ 107, 125 Stat. 428, 432 (2011) (sunsetting the domestic legislation in the event the agreement
terminates); North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 103-182,
§ 109, 107 Stat. 2057, 2067–68 (1993) (explaining what happens in the event of termination).
Implementation acts for all agreements after NAFTA contain provisions, like section 107 of the
United States–Korea Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, that purport to sunset the
legislation if the United States withdraws from or terminates an international agreement.
However, these provisions are of dubious constitutionality under Clinton v. City of New York, 524
U.S. 417 (1998), which held that Congress could not delegate to the president authority to repeal
a statute. See Tim Meyer, Trump’s Threat to Withdraw From NAFTA May Hit a Hurdle: The US
Constitution, SALON (Aug. 25, 2017, 1:43 AM), https://www.salon.com/2017/08/24/trumps-threatto-withdraw-from-nafta-may-hit-a-hurdle-the-us-constitution_partner/
[https://perma.cc/6B4EDHN6] (commenting that “[t]he same logic [from Clinton] should apply to trade agreements”); Joel
Trachtman, Trump Can’t Withdraw From NAFTA Without a ‘Yes’ From Congress, HILL (Aug. 16,
2017, 8:00 AM), https://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/international-affairs/346744-trump-cantwithdraw-from-nafta-without-a-yes-from [https://perma.cc/FYH6-T2MF] (noting that Congress
“has steadfastly avoided delegating power to the president to terminate trade agreements”).
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Even more importantly, the largest gains from trade
liberalization come from early agreements like NAFTA and the WTO
Agreements.29 According to the U.S. Trade Representative, the average
trade-weighted tariff on industrial goods imported into the United
States is 2%, and half of such goods enter duty free.30 For this reason,
later agreements, like TPP, have only small effects in terms of overall
U.S. GDP.31 That means trade liberalization’s proponents may not be
inclined to give up much to get the next trade deal, even though much
of the dislocation from trade has already been created and locked in by
earlier trade agreements.
This bargaining dynamic is not inevitable. The normative
Misalignment Thesis suggests that we can and should reform the
system to ensure that all sides have a stake in the success of both trade
liberalization and adjustment policies. Doing so requires making
credible commitments to renegotiate and implement trade
liberalization and adjustment assistance on the same timelines and
with the same fervor. This alignment can be accomplished in at least
three ways. First, adjustment assistance policies could be embedded in
trade agreements themselves, subjecting assistance policies to the same
timelines and implementation requirements as trade liberalization
commitments. Second, trade agreements could include sunset clauses
or periodic reviews that mirror the time limits on TAA’s authorization.
Third, TAA could take the form of indirect spending commitments that
would not require constant reauthorization by Congress.
This Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I explains the history of
the relationship between regulating market access for foreign products
and supporting the labor market. Historically, the United States used
trade barriers to pursue both of these policy goals. I then explain how
the creation and implementation of TAA decoupled adjustment
assistance for workers and industries hurt by trade liberalization from
trade liberalization policies themselves. This Part traces TAA from its
beginnings in the 1962 Trade Expansion Act through the most recent
legislation extending trade adjustment assistance in 2015, comparing
29. See RODRIK, supra note 17, at 57–58 (explaining that the ratio of redistribution-toefficiency gains from trade liberalization gets higher with additional trade agreements).
30. Industrial Tariffs, OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov/issueareas/industry-manufacturing/industrial-tariffs (last visited Dec. 26, 2019) [https://perma.cc/
H523-FGHJ].
31. See id. The U.S. International Trade Commission estimated that over the first fifteen
years of its existence, TPP would add only 0.15% of annual GDP growth to the U.S. economy. U.S.
INT’L TRADE COMM’N, TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT: LIKELY IMPACT ON THE U.S.
ECONOMY AND ON SPECIFIC INDUSTRY SECTORS 69–70 (2016), https://www.usitc.gov/publications/
332/pub4607.pdf [https://perma.cc/NQ6C-YVPH]. Given the size of the U.S. economy, though, this
modest growth would still have equaled $42.7 billion. Id. at 69.
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how adjustment assistance and trade liberalization policies evolved
after their decoupling in 1962. It also situates this decoupling within
the economic and policy arguments that justify it on efficiency grounds.
Part II introduces and unpacks the descriptive Misalignment
Thesis: when a legislative bargain is struck over two or more
interdependent policies, the policy subject to more frequent or costlier
renegotiation and implementation will be disfavored in the long run.
Misalignment requires that three conditions be satisfied. First, two
policies, such as market access and labor market support, must be
interdependent. Shifts in one policy create costs for proponents of the
other policy that in turn create demand for a policy response. Second,
the two policies must be decoupled, such that each policy has its own
policy instrument. Trade agreements and their domestic implementing
legislation regulate market access and trade liberalization, while trade
adjustment assistance provides labor market support. Decoupling saps
political support for using one instrument to accomplish two purposes.
Third, the law must not create credible commitments to renegotiate the
two policies at the same time or implement them in the same manner.
The absence of such credible commitments deprives proponents of the
policy subject to more frequent or costlier renegotiation or
implementation of the political leverage they need to sustain their
policy gains. As a result, the long-term stability of the entire legislative
bargain is threatened. This instability explains the current crisis in
U.S. trade policy. Trade adjustment assistance proponents lost
negotiating leverage with the creation of TAA because most of the time
Congress can cut funding or decline to extend or amend TAA without
negatively impacting trade liberalization. Trade liberalization
proponents thus have little reason to support adjustment assistance
policies.
Part III takes up the normative Misalignment Thesis by
analyzing three techniques by which Congress and the president can
align negotiations over trade liberalization and adjustment assistance
more effectively. First, the government can enshrine adjustment
assistance obligations in international agreements, making them
indefinite and subject to implementation on the same terms as trade
liberalization commitments. Second, future trade agreements could
include sunsets or periodic reviews that are timed to coincide with the
review of adjustment assistance policies. Third, Congress could reduce
renegotiation of adjustment assistance policies domestically by
providing such assistance for longer terms or through mechanisms,
such as tax expenditures, that Congress does not need to reauthorize.
Part IV concludes by considering how the Misalignment Thesis
can explain the unintended consequences of deregulatory bargains
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struck in a wide range of areas, including transportation,
telecommunications, and healthcare. In these areas and others, the
government has historically taxed or regulated the economy in a
manner that provides an implicit subsidy for goods and services that
might not otherwise be cost-competitive.32 Beginning in the midtwentieth century, however, the government deregulated many of these
industries, replacing the implicit subsidy provided by government
regulation with direct subsidies in the form of financial payments from
the government. In so doing, the government decoupled the goals of
promoting efficiency and competition in the regulated sectors from the
goal of ensuring the availability of goods and services in unprofitable
markets. Policymakers and scholars argued that direct subsidies would
be more efficient for the economy as a whole, better at achieving the
subsidies’ aims, and more politically accountable. But in most of these
fields, just as in trade, direct subsidies have failed to achieve their
objectives. This failure presents a puzzle the Misalignment Thesis can
help explain.
I. DECOUPLING TRADE REGULATION AND LABOR SUBSIDIZATION
This Part traces the historical relationship between U.S.
international trade policy and support for domestic labor markets. This
relationship has followed a familiar deregulatory arc. Historically, the
government used its power over international trade to pursue multiple
policy goals: regulating market access and protecting domestic
industries and labor. In the middle of the twentieth century, though,
the government began reducing barriers to market access—a gradual
deregulation of international trade that hurt these protected domestic
interests. The government sought to offset the costs to these domestic
interests directly through subsidies designed to support economic
adjustment. But those subsidies failed to deliver on their promise.

32. Throughout this Article, I use the term “subsidy” in the general sense of governmentdirected financial support. I do not use the term in the narrow, technical sense defined by art. 1 of
the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (“SCM Agreement”). See Agreement on
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures art. 1, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/24-scm.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BA6L-3C4Q]. Indeed, the inadequacy of that definition has been one source of
the current trade tensions between the United States and China. China provides significant
financial support to Chinese industries through a variety of means, but due to the narrow
definition of a subsidy in the SCM Agreement, WTO members have little recourse against these
practices. See David Lawder, U.S. Business Groups Say WTO Unable to Curb Many Chinese Trade
Practices, REUTERS (Oct. 4, 2017, 3:27 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-trade/us-business-groups-say-wto-unable-to-curb-many-chinese-trade-practices-idUSKBN1C92UL
[https://perma.cc/G4J4-XHGT].
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Section I.A introduces the basic theory of international trade
law. Higher trade barriers protect domestic industries and their labor
forces at the expense of foreign producers and domestic consumers.
Lower trade barriers, on the other hand, benefit domestic consumers
and foreign producers at the expense of domestic producers. Trade
policy, in other words, impacts both market access and support for
domestic industries and labor.
Section I.B provides the historical context for this relationship.
Although rarely defended as such in modern times prior to the Trump
Administration, U.S. trade policy has historically been a vehicle for
providing indirect subsidies to certain segments of the American
economy. That began to change in the mid-twentieth century with the
creation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”), the
vehicle through which nations gradually reduced their tariffs. In 1962,
the United States decoupled the regulation of international trade from
support for labor markets through the creation of the TAA program. As
this Section explains, this decoupling is in line with conventional
economic thinking that argues that trade regulation should be a
separate enterprise from labor market support.
Section I.C traces the subsequent development of TAA and trade
liberalization. Congress has repeatedly cut or failed to reauthorize TAA.
The program has only gained traction at moments when trade
liberalization’s proponents have sought to conclude additional trade
agreements. In between, trade adjustment assistance has languished.
Section I.D explains the cost of TAA’s neglect. Economic data makes
clear that, while trade liberalization has been an enormous boon to the
U.S. (and global) economy, it has created concentrated costs for certain
workers and communities to which they have not adjusted. The puzzle,
to which Part II will turn, is why decoupling trade liberalization and
adjustment assistance has failed so spectacularly.
A. The Costs and Benefits of Trade Liberalization
Trade policy is inherently distributional. On the one hand,
reducing government restrictions on the consensual exchange of goods
and services—what we usually mean by “freeing” or liberalizing trade—
creates significant wealth. Free trade enables countries to specialize in
producing those goods and services in which they have a comparative
advantage and trade for everything else.33 As a consequence, consumers
gain access to cheaper products. In this way, removing government
33. For a basic presentation of the idea of comparative advantage, see JOOST H.B. PAUWELYN,
ANDREW T. GUZMAN & JENNIFER A. HILLMAN, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 12–16 (3d ed. 2016).
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restrictions on international trade acts like an economy-wide tax cut.34
Instead of paying $5 for a gallon of milk, milk drinkers pay only $3. The
same is true for every product or service that can be imported more
cheaply than it can be produced in the home country. The overall gains
to consumers are vast.
Nor are the gains limited to the end-use consumer. Modern trade
agreements are as much about supply chains as about trade in finished
products.35 Companies can often purchase intermediate products, such
as component parts of a final product, more cheaply from foreign
producers due to trade liberalization than they would otherwise be able
to.36 Some of these savings may go into the companies’ pockets, while
some savings may be passed on to the end-use consumer. Either way,
workers employed by the firm can gain through expanded employment.
The U.S. auto industry illustrates the point. NAFTA allowed U.S.
automakers to acquire cheaper car parts from Mexico, making U.S.
automakers more competitive.37 Many have argued that the cost
savings from NAFTA saved the U.S. auto industry.38
Finally, trade liberalization helps exporters. In addition to
gaining access to cheaper intermediate goods, exporters also gain access
to foreign markets for their final products through the reciprocal

34. See Trade, at What Price?, ECONOMIST (Apr. 2, 2016), https://www.economist.com/unitedstates/2016/04/02/trade-at-what-price [https://perma.cc/7H34-W89C] (“Robert Lawrence and
Lawrence Edwards, two economists, estimate that trade with China alone put $250 a year into the
pocket of every American . . . .”); Global Trade Liberalization and the Developing Countries, INT’L
MONETARY FUND (Nov. 2001), https://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/ib/2001/110801.htm#i
[https://perma.cc/59V6-4HH4] (“Integration into the world economy has proven a powerful means
for countries to promote economic growth . . . .”).
35. See Trevor W. Nagel & Elizabeth M. Kelley, The Impact of Globalization on Structuring,
Implementing, and Advising on Sourcing Arrangements, 38 GEO. J. INT’L L. 619, 619–20 (2007)
(including “the expansion of free trade” among the factors that have facilitated manufacturing
corporations’ development of global supply chains).
36. See Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Cathleen Cimino & Tyler Moran, NAFTA at 20: Misleading
Charges and Positive Achievements, PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L ECON. 7 (May 2014)
https://www.piie.com/sites/default/files/publications/pb/pb14-13.pdf [https://perma.cc/SZ2G-Z7E8]
(noting that “imports benefit not just US consumers but also US firms that can acquire just the
right intermediate components at the right price”).
37. See Elena Holodny, Trump Wants to Renegotiate NAFTA—Here’s What You Need to
Know, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 5, 2017, 9:44 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/what-is-nafta-is-itgood-for-america-2017-2 [https://perma.cc/26ZM-DW59] (noting that “Mexico can build cars more
efficiently than the US” because of cheaper labor and parts).
38. See Eduardo Porter, Nafta May Have Saved Many Autoworkers’ Jobs, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
29, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/30/business/economy/nafta-may-have-saved-manyautoworkers-jobs.html [https://perma.cc/WR6C-FKLR] (“[T]here is a good case to be made that
without Nafta, there might not be much left of Detroit at all.”); see also Joel Cutcher-Gershenfeld,
Dan Brooks & Martin Mulloy, The Decline and Resurgence of the U.S. Auto Industry, ECON. POL’Y
INST. 18–19 (May 6, 2015), https://www.epi.org/files/2015/the-decline-and-resurgence-of-the-usauto-industry.pdf [https://perma.cc/78G5-7RG7] (describing how NAFTA influenced the growth of
the auto industry).
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exchange of trade commitments among countries. To understand the
significance of this market access, one need only look at the value
American companies put on access to Chinese markets as trade
between the two countries liberalized. For example, Coca-Cola had only
just entered China in 1979; by 2014, the country had become CocaCola’s third-largest market.39 Two trade-liberalizing events help
explain this massive growth: the first United States–China trade
agreement in 1979 and Chinese accession to the WTO in 2001.40
But while the economy as a whole, and many actors in it, benefit
from lower trade barriers, certain sectors of the economy—those that do
not compete effectively with cheaper foreign imports—benefit from high
trade barriers. To see how, consider tariffs on steel imports, which both
Presidents George W. Bush and Donald Trump imposed in an effort to
shore up electoral support in midwestern states.41 Steel tariffs—just
taxes on imported steel—make imported steel more expensive relative
to domestic steel, which is not subject to any additional tax. By
increasing the price of imported steel and aluminum, the tariffs allow
U.S. producers to increase their own prices, sell more of their product
(because their goods become cheaper relative to imports), or some
combination of the two. At the same time, tariffs also increase the price
consumers pay. Consequently, domestic consumers of steel, primarily
manufacturers, will purchase more steel from American steel
manufacturers, and at higher prices than they would pay in the absence
of tariffs.
The additional sales at a higher price constitute the American
steel producers’ indirect regulatory subsidy. Unlike a direct subsidy,
which comes from the government, the subsidy here comes from the
manufacturers that purchase steel. The premium that the steel
companies receive is, however, still effectively a subsidy because it is a
result of government regulation.42 By imposing a tariff (or other trade
39. Scott Cendrowski, Opening Happiness: An Oral History of Coca-Cola in China, FORTUNE
(Sept. 11, 2014), http://fortune.com/2014/09/11/opening-happiness-an-oral-history-of-coca-cola-inchina/ [https://perma.cc/X8RP-X5LN].
40. Agreement on Trade Relations Between the United States of America and the People’s
Republic of China, China-U.S., July 7, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 4651 (entered into force Feb. 1, 1980). China
entered the WTO in 2001. See World Trade Organization, Protocol on the Accession of the People’s
Republic of China, WTO Doc. WT/L/432 (Nov. 23, 2001) [hereinafter Protocol on China’s
Accession].
41. See Proclamation No. 9705, 83 Fed. Reg. 11,625 (Mar. 8, 2018) (announcing President
Trump’s decision to “adjust the imports of steel articles by imposing a 25 percent ad valorem tariff
on steel articles . . . imported from all countries except Canada and Mexico”); Proclamation No.
7529, 67 Fed. Reg. 10,551 (Mar. 5, 2002) (announcing President George W. Bush’s decision to
implement tariff “safeguard measures” with respect to certain types of steel products).
42. To be sure, in many cases this subsidy is inefficient in the sense that it costs those who
pay it more than it benefits recipients. Studies bore out this inefficiency in the case of President
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barriers, such as a quantitative restriction on imports), the government
redirects private dollars to its preferred recipients—a regulatory
subsidy.
President Trump’s “national security” tariffs on steel and
aluminum, imposed in 2018 and still in effect,43 illustrate how tariffs
effectively use government power to redistribute wealth from one set of
private parties to another. One estimate suggested that President
Trump’s tariffs would increase the output of the U.S. steel and
aluminum sectors by $9.8 billion and $0.8 billion, respectively.44 The
same estimate, however, suggested that a variety of other industries,
led by the vehicle and heavy manufacturing industries, would lose
roughly $22 billion in output.45 Overall, the tariffs would therefore
reduce output across all U.S. industries by $11.6 billion.46 Put
differently, President Trump used tariffs to redistribute from
downstream manufacturing industries to the steel and aluminum
industries, at a net loss to the overall economy.
B. Decoupling Market Access from Government Support
for Domestic Industries and Labor
Historically, Congress has used high trade barriers—mostly in
the form of tariffs (i.e., taxes) on imported goods—to provide just this
kind of indirect subsidy for favored industries and workers.47 In the first
half of the nineteenth century, Henry Clay successfully pushed for
tariffs as part of his “American System.”48 The protection provided by
tariffs allowed infant industries in the industrializing northeast of the
United States to develop without the threat of foreign competition,49
while also providing revenue for the federal government to invest in
Bush’s 2002 steel tariffs. See Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Ben Goodrich, Time for a Grand Bargain in
Steel?, INST. FOR INT’L ECON. (Jan. 2002), https://www.piie.com/publications/policy-briefs/timegrand-bargain-steel [https://perma.cc/RPV4-K8JJ] (estimating that every job saved by the Bush
steel tariffs would cost $584,000).
43. See Proclamation No. 9705, 83 Fed. Reg. at 11,625.
44. The Economic Impact of Steel and Aluminum Tariffs, FTI CONSULTING 2 (Aug. 2018),
https://www.fticonsulting.com/~/media/Files/us-files/insights/articles/economic-impact-steelaluminum-tariffs.pdf [https://perma.cc/AF3M-HANJ].
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See generally Timothy Meyer & Ganesh Sitaraman, Trade and the Separation of Powers,
107 CALIF. L. REV. 583, 593 (2019) (listing “the protection of industry” and “encouragement of
infant industry” as “central purposes” for tariffs in the twentieth century).
48. See MAURICE G. BAXTER, HENRY CLAY AND THE AMERICAN SYSTEM 26–28, 32 (1995)
(describing the passage of an 1820s tariff bill as being “a definite endorsement of . . . [Henry Clay’s]
proclaimed American System”).
49. F. W. TAUSSIG, THE TARIFF HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 23 (6th ed. 1914) (describing
“protection to young industries”).
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infrastructure connecting the eastern and western United States.50
Similarly, in the late nineteenth century, the Republican Party pushed
for tariffs as a way to ease the social dislocation caused by the industrial
revolution.51
In the wake of the Second World War, though, governments
created the GATT, the WTO’s precursor, to discipline governments’ use
of trade barriers, thereby limiting their usefulness to provide regulatory
subsidies for the labor market.52 High trade barriers around the globe
had fueled the tensions leading to the war, and leaders felt that putting
limits on trade barriers—mostly tariffs—would help nations rebuild
after the war and limit the chances of a third global conflict.53 And, as
the general theory of trade liberalization predicts, they were right.
Declines in tariffs led to a surge in global trade in the latter half of the
twentieth century.54 The growth in international trade, in turn, lifted
millions around the world out of poverty.55
The GATT provided the basis for a series of multilateral
negotiating “rounds” in which countries committed to lowering their
tariffs on specific products.56 The initial GATT negotiations saw
significant tariff reductions, led by what amounted to an average 35%
tariff reduction by the United States.57 But GATT members achieved
considerably less success over the course of the four rounds of
negotiations that carried them through the end of the 1950s.58
Consequently, at the beginning of the 1960s, GATT members
were looking for an opportunity to greatly reduce global tariffs. The

50. See DOUGLAS A. IRWIN, CLASHING OVER COMMERCE: A HISTORY OF US TRADE POLICY 157
(2017) (discussing “federal spending on canals, roads, and other transportation improvements as
a way of reducing the region’s economic isolation and attracting labor and capital from the East”
to the Midwest).
51. James L. Huston, A Political Response to Industrialism: The Republican Embrace of
Protectionist Labor Doctrines, 70 J. AM. HIST. 35, 36 (1983).
52. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. XXV, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55
U.N.T.S. 194, 272–73 [hereinafter GATT].
53. CHAD P. BOWN, SELF-ENFORCING TRADE: DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND WTO DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT 11 (2009).
54. See Gabriel Felbermayr & Wilhelm Kohler, WTO Membership and the Extensive Margin
of World Trade: New Evidence 2–3 (Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, Working Paper No.
304/2009, 2009), https://projekte.uni-hohenheim.de/RePEc/hoh/papers/304.pdf [https://perma.cc/
U7JS-CXRE] (noting that the average annual growth rate of the volume of world exports was 6.2%
between 1950 and 2005).
55. Press Release, World Trade Org., Free Trade Helps Reduce Poverty, Says New WTO
Secretariat Study (June 13, 2000), https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres00_e/pr181_e.htm
[https://perma.cc/36FU-HQD7].
56. See David Grieg, The GATT and Multilateral Trade Negotiations, 59 AUSTRALIAN Q. 305,
308 (1987) (providing a list of GATT negotiating rounds).
57. Douglas A. Irwin, The GATT in Historical Perspective, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 323, 325 (1995).
58. Id. (“[T]he GATT achieved remarkably little in the 15 years after the Geneva Round.”).
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United States led the way, with President Kennedy seeking
extraordinary authority from Congress to cut tariffs if an international
agreement could be reached. The Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (“TEA”)
provided the president with just that authority. Congress authorized
the president to negotiate unprecedented reductions in U.S. tariffs—up
to 50% or more in certain circumstances—in exchange for reductions
from other countries.59
As economist Douglas Irwin put it, “The resulting Kennedy
Round of trade negotiations during the 1960’s concluded with the most
substantial tariff reductions of the postwar period.”60 The United States
alone cut its nonagricultural tariffs from approximately 14% on average
to under 10%.61 Moreover, the TEA laid the groundwork for the next
two major rounds of multilateral GATT negotiations (the Tokyo and
Uruguay rounds) that ultimately concluded with the creation of the
WTO in 1995. The TEA thus represents a seminal moment in U.S. and
global trade policy.
Significantly, Congress authorized the president to make tariff
reduction commitments that lasted indefinitely. The TEA required that
the United States have the right to terminate any agreements
negotiated pursuant to its mandate with due notice, but did not put an
automatic expiration date on the tariff reductions.62 Likewise, as a
matter of international law, the GATT makes tariff commitments
indefinite in length, although it does allow nations to renegotiate their
commitments under certain circumstances.63 Therefore, the trade
liberalization commitments negotiated by the president would never
require reauthorization by Congress, nor would the president have to
take affirmative steps to extend them.
President Kennedy (and ultimately President Johnson, whose
Administration conducted the Kennedy Round negotiations) would
have had a difficult time selling these tariff reductions, though, without
59. Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, § 201(b), 76 Stat. 872 (codified at 19
U.S.C. § 1821 (2012)). The Act actually allowed for even deeper cuts in certain circumstances,
pursuant to an agreement with the European Economic Community. § 211, 76 Stat. at 873–74
(repealed 1975).
60. Irwin, supra note 57, at 326.
61. Chad P. Bown & Douglas A. Irwin, The GATT’s Starting Point: Tariff Levels Circa 1947
24 tbl.6 (Nat’l Bureau Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 21782, 2015),
https://www.nber.org/papers/w21782.pdf [https://perma.cc/3W9X-T4ZV].
62. § 255, 76 Stat. at 880 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1885 (2012)).
63. See GATT, supra note 52, art. II, 55 U.N.T.S. at 200–04 (committing states to providing
tariff treatment no less favorable than that contained in their schedule of concessions); id. art.
XXVIII, 55 U.N.T.S. at 276–78 (describing procedures for the modification of schedules). The
renegotiation process, however, encourages states to offset withdrawn concessions with new
concessions. If they do not do so, other states can withdraw concessions in response. Consequently,
the renegotiation process itself seeks to make renegotiation unattractive.
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some plan to help industries that would lose the protection from
competition that came with higher tariffs. For substantial swathes of
American production, the TEA and the resulting Kennedy Round tariff
cuts amounted to a major reduction in the implicit subsidy trade
protection provides.64 American negotiators understood this effect.
Multiple studies conducted after the Kennedy Round suggested that
U.S. negotiators agreed to smaller tariff cuts for industries that would
have a more difficult time transitioning their labor force into other
work.65
Anticipating political pushback due to the removal of protection
for sensitive industries, President Kennedy proposed that the TEA
include the Trade Adjustment Assistance program, which would offer
financial assistance to workers and firms who faced competition from a
new flood of imports.66 With TAA, President Kennedy sought to
decouple access to U.S. markets from government support for U.S.
industries and workers that compete with imports. Prior to 1962, tariff
rates had been the primary policy tool that affected both of these
policies. High tariff rates provided support for import-competing
industries by effectively limiting market access for cheaper imports—
that is, by raising the price of imported products that consumers might
otherwise purchase. Lower tariffs allowed foreign producers to sell to
domestic consumers at the expense of import-competing domestic
producers, who might have to lower their prices to remain competitive.
With the creation of TAA, access to U.S. markets—with the
greater range of choices such market access offers domestic
consumers—would continue to be influenced primarily by tariff rates.
Support for import-competing U.S. industries, though, could be
managed through TAA. The hope was that labor groups and importcompeting industries would support greater market access, since they
now had a dedicated policy instrument—direct adjustment assistance
from the federal government—to see to their needs. In other words, high
tariffs, with their costs for domestic consumers, would therefore no
64. Alfred E. Eckes, Trading American Interests, 71 FOREIGN AFF. 135, 136 (1992):
[B]y January 1972, when the Kennedy Round concessions were fully implemented,
tariffs no longer sheltered high-wage American workers from low-paid labor abroad.
American producers and workers now found themselves competing in a relatively open
international economy at a time when other improvements in transportation and
communications and the emergence of many new suppliers intensified competition.
65. See Malcolm D. Bale, United States Concessions in the Kennedy Round and Short-Run
Labour Adjustment Costs: Further Evidence, 7 J. INT’L ECON. 145 (1977); John H. Cheh, United
States Concessions in the Kennedy Round and Short-Run Labor Adjustment Costs, 4 J. INT’L ECON.
323 (1974) (hypothesizing that interindustrial variations in tariff reductions reflect a government
policy of minimizing labor adjustment problems resulting from tariff cuts).
66. §§ 301–361, 76 Stat. at 883–901 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.).
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longer be necessary in order to provide government support to importcompeting sectors of the economy.
President Kennedy justified TAA explicitly in terms of
substituting direct government support for the indirect support
provided by tariffs. He argued that “[w]hen considerations of national
policy make it desirable to avoid higher tariffs, those injured by that
competition should not be required to bear the full brunt of the impact.
Rather, the burden of economic adjustment should be borne in part by
the Federal Government.”67 Just as President Kennedy had hoped,
labor interests fell in line, supporting the TEA in exchange for the direct
support offered by the adjustment assistance program. AFL-CIO
President George Meany told the Senate Finance Committee that
“there is no question whatever that adjustment assistance is essential
to the success of trade expansion. And as we have said many times, it
is indispensable to our support of the trade program as a whole.”68
In decoupling market access from government support,
President Kennedy followed what would become a consensus view
within neoliberal trade policy: that indirect regulatory subsidies are an
inefficient and politically unaccountable means of supporting the
desired economic activity. Proponents of trade liberalization argued
that trade policy should instead follow a two-step process.69 First,
governments should negotiate international agreements aimed at
reducing trade barriers.70 By eliminating trade barriers, international
trade policy could maximize the total amount of wealth created through
trade. To be sure, trade liberalization would result in dislocations
within domestic economies. Some workers would lose their jobs; some
businesses would close. But the economic growth from trade
liberalization would create new jobs for those who lost their jobs and
new businesses in those communities that initially saw economic
retrenchment.71 The benefits of trade liberalization would, in other
words, trickle down.
In the event that the invisible hand of the market did not help
those hurt by trade liberalization, the government could step in and
provide assistance as a matter of domestic economic policy—the second
67. Special Message to the Congress on Foreign Trade Policy, 1 PUB. PAPERS 68, 76 (Jan. 25,
1962).
68. Trade Expansion Act of 1962: Hearings on H.R. 11970 Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 87th
Cong. 241 (1962) (statement of George Meany, President, American Federation of Labor and Cong.
of Industrial Organizations).
69. See Shaffer, supra note 14, at 3 (describing the two-step model of trade policy).
70. Id.
71. Timothy Meyer & Ganesh Sitaraman, A Trade Policy for All, FOREIGN AFF. (June 26,
2018),
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2018-06-26/trade-policy-all
[https://perma.cc/
YHN2-PK4C] (describing and critiquing this view of trade liberalization).
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step.72 This contingent domestic assistance was thought to have several
benefits. Most importantly, direct financial assistance would be more
efficient than indirect assistance through trade policy. As Nobel Prize–
winning economist Paul Krugman and Maurice Obstfeld, the chief
economist at the International Monetary Fund, put it:
It is always preferable to deal with market failures as directly as possible . . . . Any
proposed trade policy should always be compared with a purely domestic policy aimed at
correcting the same problem. If the domestic policy appears too costly or has undesirable
side effects, the trade policy is almost surely even less desirable . . . .73

Beyond the efficiency gains, scholars have also argued that
direct subsidies are more transparent and hence more politically
accountable than indirect subsidies.74 Both tax appropriations and the
direct receipt of government funds by a private enterprise are, in
theory, visible to the public and therefore subject to greater oversight.75
By contrast, “[f]iscal or regulatory schemes according privileges to a
particular sector can transfer resources in hidden ways,” thereby
evading public oversight.76
This theory of trickle-down trade liberalization, and its
codification in the TEA and TAA, provided the intellectual justification
for taking political fights over government support for importcompeting interests out of debates about market access. Prior to 1962,
negotiations about market access and subsidies for import-competing
labor and industry occurred on a single policy dimension—how high
should tariffs be? Although further reductions in trade barriers
continue to have both of these elements,77 after 1962 the same two
72. Shaffer, supra note 14, at 3.
73. KRUGMAN & OBSTFELD, supra note 14, at 216. Similar arguments have been made in a
range of issue areas. See e.g., Harry S. Gerla, Swimming Against the Deregulatory Tide:
Maintaining Fixed Prices in Public Offerings of Securities Through the NASD Antidiscounting
Rules, 36 VAND. L. REV. 9, 28–29 (1983) (“[U]nlike a direct subsidy, a cross-subsidy is insulated
from the increased scrutiny and give and take of the political process.”); Alfred E. Kahn, The Road
to More Intelligent Telephone Pricing, 1 YALE J. ON REG. 139, 157 (1984) (arguing that price
controls, a common form of regulatory subsidy, create “an unrealistic, inequitable and inefficient
regime in which certain groups of consumers subsidize others in ways unrelated to rational social
goals”).
74. Arthur Dunkel & Frieder Roessler, The Ranking of Trade Policy Instruments Under the
GATT Legal System, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 33, at 224, 227 (“In the case of a
production subsidy in the form of direct budgetary transfers, the costs of protection are more
apparent than in the case of import controls.”).
75. Id. at 227 (“[I]n order to subsidize, taxes need to be raised, which is an unpopular
governmental activity.”).
76. Id.
77. Of course, decoupling market access from government support reduced, but did not
remove, the pressure to use trade barriers as a form of government support. The United States,
for instance, was slow to reduce trade barriers for textiles, out of fear that foreign competition
would wipe out U.S. textile manufacturing. Developed countries throughout the world have
maintained significant tariff and non-tariff barriers on agricultural products. See M. Ataman
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issues occurred on two policy dimensions: (1) how high should tariffs
be? and (2) how much funding should be available for adjustment
assistance, for how long, and under what conditions? Creating two
policy choices where only one had existed previously undermined the
negotiating position of import-competing interests. Policymakers and
pundits with very different views about government support could
agree to pursue trade liberalization because of the overall wealth it
created. Political fights about how to distribute that wealth could occur
over a different policy instrument. As discussed below, the result was
that trade liberalization continued apace, while adjustment assistance
stagnated.
C. Adjustment Assistance’s Purgatory
Congress revisited trade’s deregulatory bargain in 1974. In so
doing, it established a pattern that persists to this day. In each
successive negotiation over trade liberalization, Congress has
reauthorized TAA only for a limited amount of time and for a limited
budget. As a consequence, failure to reauthorize the program would

Aksoy, Global Agriculture Trade Policies, in GLOBAL AGRICULTURAL TRADE AND DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES 86, 86–88 (M. Ataman Aksoy & John C. Beghin eds., 2005) (outlining the evolution of
agricultural subsidies in developing countries); Bernard Hoekman et al., Eliminating Excessive
Tariffs on Exports of Least Developed Countries, 16 WORLD BANK ECON. REV. 1, 3–4 (2002) (noting
that peak tariffs in developed countries tend to be on agricultural and textile products). These
subsidies reflect the judgment of governments that national agricultural practices—and more
broadly, national cultures associated with food—are worth supporting, even if doing so results in
higher food prices in developed countries. Aksoy, supra.
Indeed, the practice of using trade barriers to effectively subsidize favored industries continues
today. The Trump Administration has pursued the revival of tariffs in a range of sectors and has
done so explicitly on the grounds that it wishes to support those sectors of the American economy.
Beyond the steel tariffs referenced above, the Trump Administration has imposed tariffs on solar
panels, washing machines, aluminum, a wide range of products from China, and is considering
additional tariffs on autos and auto parts. David Lawder & David Shepardson, White House to
Consider Commerce Department Auto Tariff Recommendations: Officials, REUTERS (Nov. 12,
2018),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-autos/white-house-to-consider-commercedepartment-auto-tariff-recommendations-officials-idUSKCN1NH2JP
[https://perma.cc/K7F4PUY7]; Ka Zeng, Trump’s Tariffs on Chinese Products Won’t Work. Here’s Why., WASH. POST (Mar.
20, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/03/20/trumps-tariffs-onchinese-products-wont-work-heres-why/
[https://perma.cc/TE5A-N2X2].
While
economists
generally agree that these tariffs impose a net cost on the U.S. economy, they also clearly provide
a regulatory subsidy to the protected industries. In fact, part of the appeal of creating regulatory
subsidies through trade policy is that trade policy is one of the few tools the president has to dole
out subsidies unilaterally. Ordinarily, Congress must appropriate funding for subsidies. But
because Congress has delegated to the president the power to raise tariffs, he can impose such
tariffs as a way to create regulatory subsidies without first needing Congress’s permission. See
Timothy Meyer, Trade, Redistribution, and the Imperial Presidency, 44 YALE J. INT’L L. ONLINE
16 (2019) (noting that Congress has delegated almost total control over tariff rates to the president,
and presidential administrations search for policies that can be implemented without
Congressional control).
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result in its demise. By contrast, a failure to reach agreement on either
the negotiating authority for—or the approval of—a new trade
agreement would not result in a rollback of trade liberalization
commitments. Rather, it would simply curtail further trade
liberalization.
As a consequence, negotiations over trade liberalization and
TAA have occurred on different scales since trade liberalization and
adjustment assistance were decoupled in the 1960s. Trade
liberalization’s proponents only need to renegotiate the amount of trade
adjustment assistance to secure marginal increases in trade
liberalization. TAA’s proponents, however, need to renegotiate to secure
any authority for trade adjustment assistance to continue.
1. Trade Liberalization After the 1960s
The beginning of a new round of multilateral trade negotiations
at the GATT, the Tokyo Round, gave Congress reason to take up trade
policy again. In the Trade Act of 1974, Congress authorized the
president to enter into further tariff-reducing agreements. The Trade
Act was also the first statute to authorize the president to negotiate
reductions in nontariff barriers—measures other than tariffs (often
regulations) that impede imports and exports.78 The Trade Act also
established “fast-track” procedures, whereby Congress would consider
implementing legislation for any resulting agreements in an expedited
process.79 Fast-track procedures, which essentially guarantee trade
agreements an up-or-down vote in both houses of Congress without
possibility of amendment, replaced the ordinary legislative process,
which permits members of Congress to use procedural roadblocks to
slow down or block the adoption of legislation.80
By establishing fast-track procedures, the 1974 Trade Act paved
the way for the modern era of expansive trade liberalization.81 Prior to
the Trade Act, if the president negotiated an agreement reducing
nontariff barriers, Congress would have had to approve implementing
legislation through the ordinary legislative process.82 At the end of the
Kennedy Round, Congress failed to implement such an agreement
78. See Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 102, 88 Stat. 1978, 1982–84 (1975) (codified
as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2112 (2012)).
79. §§ 102, 151, 88 Stat. at 1982–84, 2001–04 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2112, 2191
(2012)).
80. § 151, 88 Stat. at 2001–04 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2191).
81. Meyer & Sitaraman, supra note 47.
82. See IAN F. FERGUSSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33743, TRADE PROMOTION AUTHORITY
(TPA) AND THE ROLE OF CONGRESS IN TRADE POLICY 2–4 (2015) (describing the historical roles of
Congress and the president in establishing foreign trade policy).
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through this ordinary process.83 This failure slowed the pace of trade
liberalization and ultimately led Congress in 1974 to use fast track to
circumscribe its review of trade agreements in order to facilitate greater
trade liberalization—a procedure Congress has regularly included in its
authorizations for trade negotiations since.84
Indeed, since the 1974 Act, the president has negotiated and
Congress has approved over a dozen trade agreements covering
virtually all of U.S. international trade. In 1979, Congress approved the
agreements coming out of the GATT’s Tokyo Round negotiations.85
Even more consequentially, in 1994 Congress approved the Marrakesh
Agreement, which created the WTO and greatly expanded the set of
multilateral trade obligations, most notably by including services and
intellectual property.86 The United States has also entered into fifteen
different free trade agreements with twenty different countries.87 Even
President Trump, no fan of trade liberalization, has gotten in on the
game, pursuing new trade agreements with Japan and the European
Union.88
2. Adjustment Assistance After the 1960s
At the same time it made trade liberalization easier, Congress
revisited TAA. First, Congress loosened the eligibility criteria and

83. Id. at 4.
84. Meyer & Sitaraman, supra note 47.
85. FERGUSSON, supra note 82, at 6.
86. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867
U.N.T.S 154 [hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement].
87. See Free Trade Agreements, OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov/tradeagreements/free-trade-agreements (last visited Dec. 26, 2019) [https://perma.cc/7X3F-PSS9]
(listing U.S. trade agreements). The United States currently has only fourteen agreements in force,
as the United States–Canada Free Trade Agreement was suspended when NAFTA entered into
force. The United States also negotiated a major twelve-nation trade agreement, known as the
Trans-Pacific Partnership, under President Obama. President Trump, however, took the United
States out of the pact. Peter Baker, Trump Abandons Trans-Pacific Partnership, Obama’s
Signature Trade Deal, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/23/us
/politics/tpp-trump-trade-nafta.html [https://perma.cc/P4LF-YBL2].
88. Bob Bryan, Trump is Launching Negotiations with Japan to Create a New Trade
Agreement, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 26, 2018, 4:26 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/trump-usjapan-trade-deal-negotiations-2018-9 [https://perma.cc/57KQ-ESUC]; David Shepardson, Trump
Administration Says to Open Trade Talks with EU, UK, Japan, REUTERS (Oct. 16, 2018, 2:16 PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-talks/trump-administration-says-to-open-tradetalks-with-eu-uk-japan-idUSKCN1MQ2P2
[https://perma.cc/6NFY-5LQ3].
The
Trump
Administration has also renegotiated NAFTA and KORUS, although the differences between the
new and old versions of these agreements are modest. Josh Zumbrun, Bob Davis, & Kwanwoo Jun,
U.S. Wins ‘Modest’ Trade Concessions from South Korea, WALL ST. J. (March 26, 2018, 7:35 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/trade-deal-eases-way-for-u-s-south-korea-to-collaborate-on-north1522058350 [https://perma.cc/GFV2-37F5].
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expanded benefits.89 Congress had originally limited funding to job
retraining and some income support while retraining was underway.90
Eligibility under the TEA was also narrow, with applicants having to
demonstrate that they had lost their jobs directly because of
competition with imports.91 Indeed, although the program was created
in 1962, the first successful application for benefits under TAA was not
accepted until 1969.92 In effect, Congress had created a program that
promised support but in practice entailed a limited financial
commitment at best.
Second, Congress authorized the program for only eight years.93
This time-limited reauthorization broke the temporal link between TAA
and U.S. trade agreements. The 1962 TEA had authorized TAA
indefinitely,94 just as it had authorized indefinite trade liberalization
commitments. Beginning in 1974, however, Congress established a
situation in which it need not take any action to extend the United
States’ trade liberalization commitments, but it must affirmatively act
to renew TAA.
Since 1974, a number of statutes have extended and
reauthorized TAA, albeit in somewhat different forms and never again
for a period longer than six years.95 Congress extended TAA in 1974,
1981, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1988, 1993, 1998, 1999, 2002, 2007, 2008,
2009, 2010, 2011, and 2015.96 By and large, these dates reflect moments
89. HORNBECK, supra note 24, at 8.
90. See C. Michael Aho & Thomas O. Bayard, Costs and Benefits of Trade Adjustment
Assistance, in THE STRUCTURE AND EVOLUTION OF RECENT U.S. TRADE POLICY 153 (Robert E.
Baldwin & Anne O. Krueger eds., 1984) (describing that the first generation of TAA provided
compensation and adjustment services to trade-displaced workers, and the program was later
liberalized and expanded beyond these narrow services).
91. See Ethan Kapstein, Trade Liberalization and the Politics of Trade Adjustment
Assistance, 137 INT’L LABOUR REV. 501, 508 (1998) (“[T]he criteria used to determine worker
eligibility for TAA required evidence that import levels in the worker’s industry had increased ‘in
major part’ because of the TEA, and that this increase was the ‘major cause’ of injury to the workers
in the specific firms in the industry.”).
92. HORNBECK, supra note 24, at 8.
93. Id. at 16.
94. Id.
95. Id. (listing the authorization periods for TAA).
96. For a complete list prior to 2013, see HORNBECK, supra note 24, at app. See also Trade
Adjustment Assistance Reauthorization Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-27, 129 Stat. 362 (to be
codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.); Trade Adjustment Assistance Extension Act of 2011, Pub.
L. No. 112-40, 125 Stat. 401 (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.); American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of U.S.C.); Trade Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-210, 116 Stat. 933 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.); Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2000, Pub. L. No.
106-113, 113 Stat. 1501 (1999) (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.); North
American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 103-182, 107 Stat. 2057 (1993)
(codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 3301–3473 (2012)); Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act
of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107 (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.);
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The pressure on adjustment assistance policies became most
clear at the end of the Tokyo Round of negotiations in 1979. In
implementing the outcome of the negotiations, Congress tried to pass
legislation extending and expanding TAA. However, in part because the
legislation was separate from the legislation approving the Tokyo
Round outcomes, and in part due to concerns about budget priorities,
the legislation died in the Senate.102
With TAA up for reauthorization in 1982, the Reagan
Administration agreed to extend it for only two years in exchange for
cuts in benefits and an overall reduction of $2.6 billion in the program’s
budget.103 When the time for reauthorization rolled around in 1983, the
Reagan Administration proposed simply eliminating the program.104
Instead, Congress extended the program until 1985, while cutting
benefits and funding once again.105 In 1985, TAA lapsed completely for
a period of three months before being reauthorized through the end of
the 1991 fiscal year.106 This reprieve, too, came with cuts; it eliminated
loans, loan guarantees, and other financial benefits for firms suffering
from import competition.107 This reluctance to support TAA came, not
surprisingly, during a period of time in which the Reagan
Administration had few international trade priorities. With no
leverage, TAA proponents were unable to prevent cuts to adjustment
assistance.
The tide turned somewhat in TAA’s favor when it came time for
Congress to once again consider big new trade agreements: NAFTA and
the WTO agreements. Legislative efforts to approve these two new
trade packages prompted reauthorization and expansion of TAA. In
1993, Congress reauthorized regular TAA and, in legislation passed in
December 1993, created a TAA program specifically for those adversely
affected by NAFTA.108 In 1999, Congress extended these programs until
2001.109
From September 2001 until August 2002, Congress let TAA
lapse again.110 The program was only reauthorized when President
George W. Bush sought trade promotion authority to negotiate new free
102. HORNBECK, supra note 24, at 9.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 103-182, §§ 501–
507, 107 Stat. 2057, 2149–54 (1993) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.).
109. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-113, § 702(b), 113 Stat. 1501,
1501A-319 (1999) (repealed 2002).
110. HORNBECK, supra note 24, at 16.
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trade agreements, such as the Central American free trade agreement
(“CAFTA”) and KORUS.111 The 2002 legislation represented perhaps
the first truly major extension of TAA in decades, creating a subsidized
health insurance program for dislocated workers, expanded eligibility
for downstream workers, and a new program for farm workers.112
Since then, however, Congress has chipped away at TAA. A
wholesale reauthorization failed to pass in 2007, and the program again
lapsed, receiving only temporary funding to continue into 2009.113 By
tying approval of trade agreements with Korea, Panama, and Columbia
to TAA’s fate, Congress managed to extend TAA to 2012, and in 2011
extended it until 2013.114 In 2015, Congress finally extended the
program until the end of fiscal year 2021.115 That six-year extension—
linked to the Obama Administration’s efforts to secure approval for the
TPP—marked the longest lease on life TAA had been given since
1986.116 But like much of the TAA legislation during the Obama
Administration, it came with cuts to funding that reduced the size and
scope of the program.117
D. The Costs of Decoupling
The historical record regarding TAA is thus clear. President
Kennedy introduced TAA explicitly to replace indirect subsidies
provided by high trade barriers with direct subsidies.118 The deal should
have been a win for everyone. The overall economy would benefit from
trade liberalization, while direct subsidies would make workers and
import-competing firms whole.
Instead, Congress has repeatedly cut TAA. Consequently,
workers and import-competing industries have not gotten what they
were promised. The shift from regulatory subsidies to direct subsidies
foreshadowed a subsequent decline in the direct subsidies. Moreover,
that decline has contributed to the erosion of the manufacturing base
111. See Trade Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-210, § 111, 116 Stat. 933, 936 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.).
112. HORNBECK, supra note 24, at 10–11.
113. Id. at 11–12.
114. Id. at 12–13.
115. Trade Adjustment Assistance Reauthorization Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-27, § 403, 129
Stat. 362, 374.
116. Congress also failed to pass TAA authorization as part of the 2015 Omnibus Trade
Accountability and Priorities Act. Instead, Congress separated trade-negotiating authority and
TAA authorization into separate bills. However, President Obama successfully insisted on signing
them together. See Obama Signs 2 Trade Bills into Law, VOA NEWS (June 29, 2015, 6:38 PM),
https://www.voanews.com/usa/obama-signs-2-trade-bills-law [https://perma.cc/4K5V-GQ3M].
117. See § 403, 129 Stat. at 374.
118. See discussion supra note 69 and accompanying text.
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in many states and communities, the loss of middle-class jobs, and
economic insecurity that threatens the stability of an international
trading system that has delivered economic growth and development to
millions around the world, including within the United States.
More specifically, TAA has failed to stop or significantly smooth
out the disruptions from the well-documented decline of U.S.
manufacturing, especially in the midwestern United States. That
decline has put downward pressure on employment and wages, and it
has created fears about long-term economic security.119 The American
steel sector again provides a case in point. Data from the U.S. Bureau
of Labor Statistics shows that from 2000 to 2016, U.S. steel jobs
declined by 35%, a loss of 48,000 jobs.120 Similar trends can be found in
data from the group Public Citizen, which tracks the number of net
manufacturing jobs lost in each state since the United States joined
NAFTA and the WTO, as reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.121
For instance, according to Public Citizen, Pennsylvania has lost 308,676
jobs (a 35.4% decline in the sector) and Ohio has lost 276,474
manufacturing jobs (a 28.5% decline in the sector).122
While other causes besides trade liberalization, such as
automation, have contributed to these job losses, there is no longer any

119. See David B. Muhlhausen & James Sherk, Trade Adjustment Assistance: Let the
Ineffective and Wasteful “Job-Training” Program Expire, HERITAGE FOUND. 1, 2–4 (Dec. 4, 2014),
https://www.heritage.org/jobs-and-labor/report/trade-adjustment-assistance-let-the-ineffectiveand-wasteful-job-training [https://perma.cc/BA6U-7EKM] (arguing that TAA actually lowers the
future earnings of its participants); Mark Muro & Joseph Parilla, Maladjusted: It’s Time to
Reimagine
Economic
‘Adjustment’
Programs,
BROOKINGS
(Jan.
10,
2017),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/the-avenue/2017/01/10/maladjusted-its-time-to-reimagineeconomic-adjustment-programs/ [https://perma.cc/2V2H-CVF6] (discussing the need for changes
to U.S. economic adjustment programs, especially in light of today’s pervasive labor market
disruptions).
120. Joseph S. Pete, U.S. Steel Industry Has Lost 48,000 Jobs Since 2000, NORTHWEST IND.
TIMES (Aug. 16, 2016), https://www.nwitimes.com/business/steel/u-s-steel-industry-has-lost-jobssince/article_4ffd704a-1cdc-5eb9-82eb-0b858a369877.html [https://perma.cc/6DS2-GM3P].
121. Trade-Related Job Losses by State, PUB. CITIZEN, https://www.citizen.org/ourwork/globalization-and-trade/trade-related-job-loss-state
(last
visited
Nov.
1,
2019)
[https://perma.cc/3KK2-CZNM].
122. Pennsylvania Job Loss During the NAFTA-WTO Period, PUB. CITIZEN,
https://www.citizen.org/article/pennsylvania-job-loss-during-the-nafta-wto-period/ (last visited
Sept. 29, 2019) [https://perma.cc/73HC-YAW5]; Ohio Job Loss During the NAFTA-WTO Period,
PUB. CITIZEN, https://www.citizen.org/article/ohio-job-loss-during-the-nafta-wto-period/ (last
visited Sept. 29, 2019) [https://perma.cc/WDG2-XL9N]. Although these data show a correlation
between trade liberalization and the decline of manufacturing jobs, they say nothing about the
overall effects of trade, do not indicate that all of the job losses were caused by trade, and do not
say anything about the effects of trade on those who previously held the eliminated positions.
Many such people will have gained employment in nonmanufacturing jobs, some of which were
created by trade.
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doubt that trade liberalization itself has played a major role.123 And
while economists argued that labor markets would adjust to absorb
unemployed workers into new jobs created by a more efficient
economy,124 recent studies have found that the local effects of job losses
from free trade agreements have not been offset by newly created jobs,
which are often located far from the communities in which jobs are
lost.125 While accepting the substantial benefits of trade to the nation
as a whole, these studies have focused on the negative impact of
reducing trade barriers on goods from new U.S. trading partners,
especially China, on local labor markets in the United States.126 Most
importantly, David Autor, David Dorn, and Gordon Hanson have shown
that communities that lost jobs after China joined the WTO in 2001 had
still not recovered a decade later—a blow to the claim that the benefits
of trade liberalization trickle down in a way that offsets trade
liberalization’s costs.127
Given the stakes for the stability of the international trading
system, the United States’ failure to make good on TAA’s promise to
workers is odd. Why has the federal government maintained its

123. These job losses may seem like a drop in the bucket of the entire U.S. economy, which
loses (or “churns”) about 4 million jobs a year. See Hufbauer, Cimino & Moran, supra note 36, at
5. Indeed, one of the great benefits of trade liberalization is that it can create many more new jobs
through the more efficient allocation of resources. See, e.g., Miriam Sapiro, Why Trade Matters,
BROOKINGS (Sept. 1, 2014), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Trade-GlobalViews_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/3Y5G-7Y5R] (discussing the economic rationales for an
ambitious trade policy, including the creation of many new jobs). But to those workers who lose
their jobs and struggle to find comparable work, the loss of a secure paycheck is devastating. See
Farah Stockman, Becoming a Steelworker Liberated Her. Then Her Job Moved to Mexico., N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 14, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/14/us/union-jobs-mexico-rexnord.html
[https://perma.cc/P5D5-QV38] (describing the effects of losing steel jobs on individuals in the
midwestern United States).
124. See, e.g., Jagdish Bhagwati, Opinion, Technology, Not Globalisation, Drives Wages Down,
FIN. TIMES (Jan. 3, 2007), https://www.ft.com/content/f8738fba-9b53-11db-aa70-0000779e2340
[https://perma.cc/28GH-UYCD] (“[E]mpirical studies . . . .show that the adverse effect of trade on
wages is not substantial.”); Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Speech Before the Greater
Omaha Chamber of Commerce: The Level and Distribution of Economic Well-Being (Feb. 6, 2007),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20070206a.htm
[https://perma.cc/
2DDP-N8FL] (“Because labor markets are adaptable, outsourcing abroad does not ultimately
affect aggregate employment, but it may affect the distribution of wages . . . .”).
125. David H. Autor, David Dorn & Gordon H. Hanson, The China Shock: Learning from
Labor-Market Adjustment to Large Changes in Trade, 8 ANN. REV. ECON. 205, 205 (2016):
Alongside the heralded consumer benefits of expanded trade are substantial
adjustment costs and distributional consequences. These impacts are most visible in
the local labor markets in which the industries exposed to foreign competition are
concentrated. Adjustment in local labor markets is remarkably slow, with wages and
labor-force participation rates remaining depressed and unemployment rates
remaining elevated . . . .
126. Id. at 221–34.
127. Id. at 224.
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commitment to trade liberalization but not to TAA, the other half of the
bargain struck on trade policy?
II. MISALIGNMENT IN TRADE LAWMAKING
Lawmaking is an iterative process. Lawmakers often revisit
prior laws in order to update them in light of new information or to
renegotiate the distribution of costs and benefits. Indeed, lawmakers
establish ex ante the terms under which renegotiation occurs.
Lawmakers might, for instance, include a sunset provision in a law.
Sunset provisions require lawmakers to reenact—and hence give them
an opportunity to renegotiate—a law.128 Trouble can occur, however,
when different parts of a legislative bargain are subject to different
methods of renegotiation and implementation. In these situations,
beneficiaries of the policy that is more frequently subject to
renegotiation or costlier implementation will see their gains erode over
time. Worse, these chronic losers may try to bring down both planks of
the initial legislative bargain.
In this Part, I set out the descriptive Misalignment Thesis—the
theory of misaligned renegotiation and how it ultimately can lead to the
collapse of the entire trading system. Section I.A defines misaligned
lawmaking and explains how it operates in trade policy. Section II.B
discusses the welfare effects of misaligned lawmaking.
A. The Theory
The descriptive Misalignment Thesis holds that when a
legislative bargain is struck over two or more interdependent policies,
the policy or policies subject to more frequent or costlier renegotiation
and implementation will be disfavored in the long run.129 The intuition
is straightforward. When two policies are interrelated, supporters of
both policies can strike a legislative bargain in which each gets the
policy outcome it desires. Absent such mutual support, the bargain
would not pass. Misalignment occurs when one of these policies is

128. See, e.g., Dan R. Price, Sunset Legislation in the United States, 30 BAYLOR L. REV. 401,
401 (1978) (describing sunset legislation).
129. Public law scholars have long been worried about entrenching policies against democratic
change. See, e.g., Rebecca M. Kysar, The Sun Also Rises: The Political Economy of Sunset
Provisions in the Tax Code, 40 GA. L. REV. 335 (2006) (discussing the failure of sunset provisions
to dislodge entrenched interest groups); Daryl Levinson & Benjamin I. Sachs, Political
Entrenchment and Public Law, 125 YALE L.J. 400 (2015) (demonstrating the ways in which
political actors entrench their policies through functional means). Misalignment raises a similar,
but distinct, concern. Misaligned lawmaking focuses on the relative costs of changing a policy and
the impacts of those relative differences, rather than the absolute costs of changing a single policy.
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subject to more frequent or costlier renegotiation. Because the policy
under renegotiation only passed as part of a package, renegotiating it
without the other elements of the package leads to cuts in the policy.
Proponents simply do not have the leverage in the subsequent
negotiation that they had in the initial negotiation. Differences in the
costs of implementation have a similar effect. If implementing one
policy is substantially easier, changes to the policy can be made as part
of the implementation process, obviating the need for a formal
renegotiation.
Misaligned lawmaking occurs when three conditions are
satisfied: (1) interdependence, (2) decoupling, and (3) an absence of a
credible commitment in the initial legislative bargain to renegotiate the
two interdependent policies together. I explain these three conditions
below.
1. Interdependence
By interdependence, I mean that a policy addressing one
problem will have consequences that create demand for a policy
response to a separate problem.130 Trade liberalization and trade
adjustment assistance are one example. Trade liberalization, a policy of
reducing barriers to imports, exposes some domestic industries to
foreign competition, creating job losses. Those job losses, or their
prospect, spur demand for a policy response.131 Prior to 1962, that policy
response primarily took the form of higher trade barriers for swaths of
the U.S. economy, i.e., it took the form of resisting trade liberalization.
After 1962, though, the primary policy response has been trade
adjustment assistance.132
Other examples of interdependence abound. Deregulation of
transportation markets, like airlines and railroads, causes carriers to
abandon unprofitable routes.133 The absence of travel options in remote
130. This idea is somewhat similar to the idea of a regulatory externality, although it lacks
the geographic or cross-border feature often ascribed to that term. See, e.g., Ben Depoorter &
Francesco Parisi, The Modernization of European Antitrust Enforcement: The Economics of
Regulatory Competition, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 309, 316 (2005) (discussing the positive
externalities of antitrust regulation).
131. See supra Sections I.A–I.B (discussing the costs and benefits of trade liberalization and
noting congressional responses to mitigate those costs).
132. Although political resistance to further trade liberalization has continued, it has largely
been unsuccessful, as evidenced by the fact that the United States has a trade-weighted average
tariff of only 2% on industrial goods. See Industrial Tariffs, supra note 30.
133. Cf. Andrew R. Goetz & Timothy M. Vowles, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: 30 Years of
U.S. Airline Deregulation, 17 J. TRANSP. GEOGRAPHY 251, 257 (2009) (“In general, service and fares
in shorter-distance and less-traveled city-pair markets . . . have not been as good as those in
longer-distance and heavily-trafficked markets.”); Phillip Longman & Lina Khan, Terminal
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parts of the country, in turn, creates pressure for a regulatory response
to provide such options.134 Regulatory approval of a new mine or oil
drilling project may create demand for environmental regulation.135
This kind of interdependence is different from merely including
two policies within the same piece of legislation. Any two policies can
be included in the same bill or be subject to vote-trading. During his
second term, for instance, President Obama sought negotiation
authority (also known as trade promotion authority) to conclude
negotiations on the Trans-Pacific Partnership.136 Such authority would
allow him to submit the agreement to an up-or-down vote in Congress,
rather than subjecting it to amendment.137 Legislation granting
President Obama trade promotion authority, however, failed in the
House of Representatives.138 To pass the legislation, the House attached
trade promotion authority to an unrelated bill on police officers’ and
firefighters’ retirement plans.139 Democrats opposed to granting
President Obama trade promotion authority accused Republicans of
linking the two measures because it would look bad for Democrats to
vote down a bill supporting police officers and firemen.140
Sickness: How a Thirty-Year-Old Policy of Deregulation is Slowly Killing America’s Airline System,
WASH. MONTHLY (Mar.–Apr. 2012), https://washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/marchapril2012/terminal-sickness/ [https://perma.cc/B3HR-XPMC] (noting that “over the last five years,
service to medium-airports fell by 18 percent”).
134. For example, in response to the Airline Deregulation Act, Congress established the
Essential Air Service program to ensure that smaller communities would retain access to the
National Air Transportation System. Essential Air Service, U.S. DEP’T TRANSP.,
https://www.transportation.gov/policy/aviation-policy/small-community-rural-airservice/essential-air-service (last updated Nov. 22, 2017) [https://perma.cc/3FB3-XRFB] (“The
Essential Air Service (EAS) program was put into place to guarantee that small communities that
were served by certificated air carriers before airline deregulation maintain a minimal level of
scheduled air service.”).
135. See James Conca, Is Fracking for Gas as Dirty as Coal?, FORBES (May 5, 2016),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jamesconca/2016/05/05/is-fracking-for-gas-dirty-enough-for-a-coalresurgence/#21b2e8664727 [https://perma.cc/8LFH-M7PN] (discussing how fracking for natural
gas resulted in a growing antifracking movement).
136. See Doug Palmer, Obama Speaks out on Trade, POLITICO (Sept. 19, 2013, 2:29 PM),
https://www.politico.com/story/2013/09/obama-trade-promotion-authority-097073
[https://perma.cc/NE4E-GQMP] (describing Obama’s efforts to pass trade promotion authority).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Teamsters Denounce Hijacking of Firefighter Retirement Bill to Pass Fast Track in House,
TEAMSTERS (June 18, 2015), https://teamster.org/news/2015/06/teamsters-denounce-hijackingfirefighter-retirement-bill-pass-fast-track-house [https://perma.cc/H7WY-BTSM] (discussing how
the House of Representatives attached trade promotion authority to “the Defending Public Safety
Employees’ Retirement Act, a widely-supported bill that enables federal firefighters to access their
retirement savings once they reach retirement age”).
140. 161 CONG. REC. H4507-02 (daily ed. June 18, 2015) (statement of Rep. Bill Pascrell)
(“Today, this bill to provide tax fairness for our law enforcement officers has been twisted and
diminished to a convenient vehicle to ram through fast track for a deeply flawed bill.”); see 161
CONG. REC. H4497-03 (daily ed. June 18, 2015) (statement of Rep. Donna Edwards) (saying that
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This kind of linkage is happenstance. It occurs only because two
issues happen to be before Congress at the same time and therefore
provide a basis for bargaining. But because the two issues are otherwise
unrelated, they are unlikely to be linked again in the future. Nothing
about supporting retirement plans for police officers and firefighters
will create a demand for a new trade agreement or for trade adjustment
policies.
Interdependent issues, by contrast, will arise together precisely
because changing policy on one issue creates costs within another issue
space. Those costs create pressure for policies to address both issues
simultaneously. Those responses may be linked in legislation or not.
The key idea, though, is that the issues are interlocking in a way that
creates a demand for negotiation across the two issues.
2. Decoupling
By decoupling, I mean the phenomenon of taking a single policy
instrument that affects two interdependent policy goals and creating a
second policy instrument to deal with one of those goals. President
Kennedy, for example, decoupled trade liberalization and market access
from labor market support and adjustment assistance by proposing the
TAA program.141 As discussed in Part I, before TAA, trade barriers,
most notably tariffs, were a single policy instrument governing two
issues. They limited market access, and they also provided labor market
support for import-competing sectors of the economy. After TAA, the
government could use trade barriers primarily to regulate market
access, while TAA would separately address the labor implications of
trade policy.
Decoupling occurs in many areas of policy. For instance, the
federal government used to require transportation providers (railroads,
airlines, and so on) to provide service to unprofitable routes.142 The
government effectively subsidized those routes through price
regulation—setting higher than market prices for profitable routes and
forbidding new entrants from undercutting those prices. In the late
twentieth century, though, Congress decoupled general regulation of
transportation networks from the goal of universal service. It loosened
or dropped its price controls while replacing the universal service
attaching trade promotion authority to this unrelated bill is “doing it in the most shameful
way . . . hiding behind our first responders”).
141. See discussion supra note 69 and accompanying text.
142. See, e.g., THEODORE E. KEELER, RAILROADS, FREIGHT, AND PUBLIC POLICY 20–25 (1983)
(discussing how the British and American governments controlled transportation routes from the
sixteenth century through the Transportation Act of 1920).
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mandate with subsidies for rural transportation networks.143 Similarly,
by creating a separate environmental regulatory structure—such as
through the creation of the Environmental Protection Agency—it
allowed for separate consideration of the environmental costs of
particular kinds of economic activity.144 Regulation of the economic
activity itself no longer had to be a proxy for environmental concerns.
Decoupling is a necessary condition for misalignment. With only
a single policy instrument, misalignment cannot occur because both
issues must necessarily be renegotiated at the same time. For instance,
if trade barriers are both the means of regulating market access and
providing support for labor markets, renegotiating trade barriers will
necessarily activate constituencies interested in both of those issues.
Misalignment can only occur once two interdependent issues can be
renegotiated separately. These separate renegotiations introduce the
possibility that lawmakers will not take into account the costs of a
policy on another interdependent issue area.
Decoupling, of course, does not remove the possibility that two
different issue groups will bargain over how a single policy instrument
should be used. Import-competing interests, most notably labor,
continue to oppose new trade agreements the government proposes.145
But decoupling saps political support for this kind of linkage. It provides
lawmakers with an argument that particular policy issues (e.g., labor
market policies) should be dealt with through particular policy
instruments (adjustment assistance).
Significantly, decoupling is a necessary regulatory innovation to
enable the “two-step” model of trade policy.146 Under that model,
advocates urge that the government pursue trade liberalization without
concern for its effects on labor markets or environmental issues and
instead address those problems through domestic policy.147 Decoupling
provides the domestic legal and policy tools that allow politicians to
endorse this view of how trade should be regulated. More generally,
143. See Essential Air Service, supra note 134; History and Mission, NAT’L RURAL TRANSIT
ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, https://www.nationalrtap.org/About/History-and-Mission (last visited Dec.
26, 2019) [https://perma.cc/C2YX-NL4N] (providing funding “to establish and maintain transit
systems in communities with populations under 50,000”).
144. See RICHARD NIXON, REORGANIZATION PLANS NOS. 3 AND 4 OF 1970, H.R. DOC. NO. 91366, at 1 (1970) (collecting environmental responsibilities from other agencies and vesting them in
a new Environmental Protection Agency); see also National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub.
L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4347 (2012)).
145. Vicki Needham, Labor, Environmental Groups Call on Congress to Oppose TPP, HILL
(May 23, 2016, 3:19 PM), https://thehill.com/policy/finance/trade/280938-labor-environmentalgroups-call-on-congress-to-oppose-tpp [https://perma.cc/9XGU-U34X] (describing labor unions’
opposition to the Trans-Pacific Partnership).
146. See Shaffer, supra note 69, at 2–3 (describing the two-step model).
147. See id.
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decoupling is an overlooked innovation that has aided the political push
for deregulation. Deregulating industries becomes politically easier
when the competing objectives of deregulation are separated and each
are assigned their own policy instrument.
Decoupling, in other words, creates political space for more
single-issue bargaining. In traditional economic thinking, this singleissue bargaining is a virtue.148 As I explain below, though, in the
absence of credible commitments to renegotiate interdependent issues
together, decoupling turns into a vice.
3. Absence of Credible Commitments
Finally, misalignment requires the absence of credible
commitments to renegotiate the two policy instruments together.149 In
enacting an initial bargain, Congress can decide that it will revisit
certain parts of the bargain but not others. The consequence is that
different provisions of the bargain are subject to different default rules
on renegotiation. Trade adjustment assistance programs expire if
Congress does not renegotiate. Trade liberalization provisions in
legislation only expire if Congress does renegotiate, while trade
agreements only terminate if the United States (or another state party)
affirmatively withdraws.150 Of course, getting Congress to take
affirmative action is considerably tougher than getting it to take no
action. This status quo bias is true of all legislatures, but has been
especially true of the U.S. Congress as political polarization has grown
in recent years. Congressional output in recent years, in terms of

148. See discussion supra note 14 and accompanying text.
149. A credible commitment is one that binds actors across time and space. See Douglass C.
North, Institutions and Credible Commitment, 149 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 11, 11
(1993).
150. One possible, and modest, limit on this inaction is the common practice of including
clauses in trade agreement implementation acts purporting to sunset the legislation if U.S.
participation in the agreement ceases. See United States–Korea Free Trade Agreement
Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 112-41, § 107, 125 Stat. 428, 432 (2011) (“On the date on which
the Agreement terminates, this Act . . . and the amendments made by this Act . . . shall cease to
have effect.”); Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement
Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 109-53, § 107(d), 119 Stat. 462, 466 (2005) (“On the date on which
the Agreement ceases to be in force with respect to the United States, the provisions of the Act
(other than this subsection) and the amendments made by this Act shall cease to have effect.”).
However, these clauses are only triggered if either the agreement terminates because other parties
withdraw, or if the president withdraws the United States from the agreement. Such withdrawals
rarely occur and thus, ex ante, are unlikely to force Congress’s hand. Moreover, as noted above,
see discussion supra note 28, these untested sunset provisions are likely unconstitutional under
the Supreme Court’s decision in Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 447 (1998).
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statutes passed, has been among the lowest in the United States’ 240year history.151
When two interdependent and decoupled policies are
renegotiated together, the odds of getting an agreement that furthers
both policies is at its maximum. Legislatures are multimember bodies
that operate by majority or supermajority rule.152 Proponents of a
particular measure, such as trade liberalization or trade adjustment
assistance, must assemble a coalition to enact their proposal. Many
measures will not, however, command the necessary support on their
own. As a consequence, a measure’s supporters will frequently seek to
build coalitions by packaging multiple measures together into a single
bill or by trading votes across different bills.153 Renegotiating
interdependent issues together allows for these coalitions to form across
the two interdependent issues. The ultimate package that emerges will
reflect the relative political strength of two groups of issue advocates,
but the possibility of a bargain that responds to both issues increases
when they are renegotiated together.154
By contrast, in the absence of a credible commitment to
renegotiate together, advocates of the issue that must be renegotiated
more frequently will likely have to do so without the benefit of being
able to tie their issue to its most natural companion issue. If the issue
does not enjoy majority support on its own, advocates are left looking
for other issues around which they can build coalitions. As with the
example of tying trade promotion authority to public safety workers’
pensions in 2015, such coalitions may form if political circumstances
happen to work out.155 But the natural constituency for a deal—those
in favor of a particular policy goal in regard to the interdependent
issue—will have no incentive to participate. The absence of a credible

151. Chris Cillizza, Yes, President Obama Is Right. The 113th Congress Will Be the Least
Productive in History., WASH. POST (Apr. 10, 2014, 11:33 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/the-fix/wp/2014/04/10/president-obama-said-the-113th-congress-is-the-least-productiveever-is-he-right/ [https://perma.cc/3CXC-QYPH].
152. See CHRISTOPHER M. DAVIS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 95-563, THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS
ON THE HOUSE FLOOR: AN INTRODUCTION 1 (2019) (describing how “a majority of Members should
ultimately be able to work their will on the floor”); VALERIE HEITSHUSEN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
96-548, THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS ON THE SENATE FLOOR: AN INTRODUCTION 8 (2019) (describing
when simple majority and supermajority votes are required).
153. See ROBERT D. COOTER, THE STRATEGIC CONSTITUTION 52–53 (2000) (describing and
analyzing legislative bargaining and vote trading in economic terms).
154. Of course, if one policy commands sufficient support in a legislature, independent of how
the legislature’s members feel about the other policy, then this kind of bargaining is irrelevant. In
such a situation, the alignment or misalignment of two policies does not affect the policy outcome.
However, the prevalence of amendments and pork barrel legislation attests to the fact that such
dominance occurs rarely on major legislation.
155. See discussion supra note 139 and accompanying text.
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commitment to renegotiate the two policies together thus weakens the
bargaining position of advocates for the policy that must be
renegotiated more frequently.
4. Renegotiating Trade Liberalization and
Trade Adjustment Assistance
Within U.S. trade law, the absence of a commitment to
simultaneous renegotiation comes from pairing short-term adjustment
assistance programs with indefinite trade liberalization commitments.
This discrepancy in time horizons results in part from constitutional
rules limiting Congress’s ability to delegate the authority to spend
funds—a limitation that does not apply to tariffs or regulatory
authority. As a result, the implementation of trade liberalization occurs
within the executive branch, which can use its authority over
implementation to update trade liberalization without returning to
Congress.
Appropriating funds for specific programs like TAA is a two-step
process. First, the appropriations must be authorized. Second, Congress
must actually appropriate the funds. As Part I explained, Congress can
and does place time limits on both of these aspects of appropriations.
For instance, the Trade Act of 1974 authorized appropriations for trade
adjustment assistance until September 30, 1982.156 The amounts,
however, were left to the discretion of the appropriations process
itself.157 Similarly, the 2015 Trade Adjustment Assistance
Reauthorization Act extended the authorization for appropriations only
until June 30, 2021.158
Trade adjustment assistance, in other words, has a short lease
on life that must constantly be renewed through subsequent legislation.
Under current law, unless trade liberalization’s proponents happen to
be pushing for a new trade agreement in 2021—an uncertain prospect
given the major ongoing turmoil in the trading system—TAA’s
proponents will have to look for other concessions they can make to
attract support for an extension. They will, in other words, not have the
most natural concession they could make, namely agreeing to the
continuation of reduced trade barriers in exchange for the continuation

156. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 284, 88 Stat. 1978, 2041 (“Chapters 2, 3, and 4 of
this Title shall become effective on the 90th day following the date of the enactment of this Act
and shall terminate on September 30, 1982.”).
157. § 245(b)(1), 88 Stat. at 2027 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2317 (2012)) (authorizing
the appropriation of such funds “as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this chapter”).
158. Trade Adjustment Assistance Reauthorization Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-27, § 403(a),
129 Stat. 362, 374.
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of reduced assistance. Nor can they expect a rush of congressional
support for the extension of TAA. Fiscally conservative members of
Congress have for years urged cuts to spending on social programs.
Indeed, the 2015 TAA provisions actually reduced spending on TAA
from the levels established in 2011.159 The result is that TAA’s
proponents are likely to face an uphill battle in pushing for further
assistance unless new trade agreements are on the congressional
agenda.
TAA’s limited duration stems in part from limitations, both
constitutional and practical, on Congress’s ability to delegate the
authority to appropriate funding. Current trade adjustment assistance
programs, such as unemployment insurance, relocation expenses, and
job retraining, involve the expenditure of funds. As a consequence,
Congress is constitutionally required to maintain a role in trade
adjustment assistance programs. The Appropriations Clause of the
Constitution provides that “no Money shall be drawn from the
Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.”160 The
Supreme Court has explained that the Appropriations Clause means
that “the expenditure of public funds is proper only when authorized by
Congress, not that public funds may be expended unless prohibited by
Congress.”161
The result is that Congress cannot easily delegate away
responsibility for programs, such as TAA, that require financial
support. The executive branch cannot, for instance, infer the authority
to spend money in support of a program that Congress has authorized
unless Congress has separately appropriated funding for the
program.162 As Kate Stith has argued, the role of the Appropriations
Clause is to impose on Congress a nondelegable responsibility to
approve all expenditures of public funds.163
159. Cathleen Cimino-Isaacs & Gary Clyde Hufbauer, The Fate of Trade Adjustment
Assistance: The Basics, PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L ECON. (June 11, 2015, 12:15 PM),
https://www.piie.com/blogs/trade-investment-policy-watch/fate-trade-adjustment-assistancebasics [https://perma.cc/3SYX-Q42B] (“The [proposed 2015] TAA program would cap total
spending at $450 million annually through 2021, subject to certain requirements. For context, this
represents a cutback in assistance based on larger caps of $575 million in 2011 and over $600
million in 2009.”).
160. U.S. CONST. art I, § 9, cl. 7.
161. United States v. MacCollom, 426 U.S. 317, 321 (1976).
162. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-16-464SP, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL
APPROPRIATIONS LAW 1-6 (2016) (“[T]he Constitution vests in Congress the power and duty to
affirmatively authorize all expenditures.”).
163. Kate Stith, Congress’ Power of the Purse, 97 YALE L.J. 1343, 1349 (1988):
Since legislative appropriations power is rooted in article I, section 8, we may infer that
a primary significance of the appropriations clause in section 9 lies in what it takes
away from Congress: the option not to require legislative appropriations prior to
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To be sure, Congress sometimes authorizes the appropriation of
funds on a permanent or indefinite basis.164 However, such
authorizations are rare, relative to time-limited appropriations, and
usually rely on nontax revenue sources, such as fees or gifts.165 The
much more common approach is for Congress to limit the availability of
funds to a finite period of time.166
Similarly, the executive branch might repurpose funds that
Congress has already authorized and appropriated to offset the costs of
its trade policies. The Trump Administration has done just this,
providing subsidies to farmers who have been victims of the Trump
Administration’s trade war with China.167 Although such reliance on
preexisting authority provides some flexibility for the executive branch
to both make trade policy and use subsidies to offset harms caused by
its policies, the approach will be limited in its effectiveness. Preexisting
authorities may not, for instance, authorize funding in sufficient levels
to compensate for particular trade programs, especially in the long
term.168 Moreover, repurposing funds or relying on authorities not
intended to offset trade policies may be controversial, raising questions
about the legitimacy or even legality of the payments.169

expenditure. If the Constitution thus strictly forbids “executive appropriation” of public
funds, the exercise by Congress of its power of the purse is a structural imperative.
(footnotes omitted).
164. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 162, at 1-6.
165. See id.; Stith, supra note 163, at 1378–79 (“[W]henever Congress authorizes an agency to
receive and expend gifts, fees, or other payments—in addition to the agency’s specific
appropriations—the legislative authorization constitutes what is known as a ‘permanent’ and
‘indefinite’ appropriation.”).
166. See Stith, supra note 163, at 1354 n.53 (noting that operating funds are usually
appropriated on an annual basis); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12 (limiting appropriations
for the armed forces to two years).
167. The Trump Administration has imposed tariffs on billions of dollars’ worth of Chinese
imports, leading China to retaliate with tariffs on U.S. products, including agricultural products.
The Trump Administration responded by providing approximately $12 billion to farmers in 2018
and $16 billion in 2019. The Administration relied on authority contained in the Commodity Credit
Corporation Charter Act, 15 U.S.C. § 714 (2012), that was arguably not intended to cover programs
to offset an administration’s trade policies or programs on the scale of the Trump Administration’s
subsidy program. See RANDY SCHNEPF ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45310, FARM POLICY:
USDA’S 2018 TRADE AID PACKAGE 4 (2019) (“The primary authority for the trade aid package is
the Secretary of Agriculture’s discretion to use the general powers of the CCC.”).
168. See Humeyra Pamuk & Karl Plume, U.S. to Pay Farmers up to $16 Billion for Trade War
Losses, South to Benefit, REUTERS (July 25, 2019, 12:59 PM), https://in.reuters.com/article/usatrade-china/u-s-to-pay-farmers-up-to-16-billion-for-trade-war-losses-south-to-benefitidINKCN1UK2NM [https://perma.cc/DX4L-J3AJ] (quoting farm industry representatives as
saying that the Trump Administration’s plan “is not a long term solution”).
169. See SCHNEPF ET AL., supra note 167, at 11 (“Using this authority is not without precedent,
but the scope and scale of its use for the trade aid package has increased congressional and public
interest.”).
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The trade liberalization provisions of international trade
agreements and the related domestic implementing legislation lack any
similar time limits. U.S. trade agreements themselves continue
indefinitely until such time as either a party withdraws or the parties
agree to terminate the agreement.170 These durational provisions (or
the lack thereof) are mirrored in the domestic statutes that provide the
executive branch the authority to implement trade agreements. For
instance, Section 107 of the United States–Korea Free Trade
Implementation Act provides only that “[o]n the date on which the
Agreement terminates, this Act . . . shall cease to have effect.”171
Similar provisions have appeared in all U.S. trade agreement
implementing legislation since the beginning of the twenty-first
century.172
This indefinite duration is possible because, unlike
appropriations, Congress can delegate control of trade liberalization
policy to the executive branch. Consequently, Congress can remove
itself from implementing, and hence renegotiating, existing trade
liberalization commitments in a way that it cannot with respect to trade
adjustment assistance.
Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution provides that “[t]he
Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts
and Excises.”173 As a constitutional matter, then, Congress has
authority over what has historically been the primary instrument of

170. See, e.g., Marrakesh Agreement art. XV (“[W]ithdrawal shall apply both to this
Agreement and the Multilateral Trade Agreements and shall take effect upon the expiration of six
months from the date on which written notice of withdrawal is received by the Director-General of
the WTO.”); NAFTA, supra note 27, art. 2205 (“A Party may withdraw from this Agreement six
months after it provides written notice of withdrawal to the other Parties. If a Party withdraws,
the Agreement shall remain in force for the remaining Parties.”).
171. United States-Korea Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 112-41,
§ 107(c), 125 Stat. 428, 432 (2011).
172. See, e.g., United States-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L.
No. 110-138, § 107(c), 121 Stat. 1455, 1459 (2007) (“On the date on which the Agreement
terminates, the provisions of this Act (other than this subsection) and the amendments made by
this Act shall cease to have effect.”); Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free
Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 109-53, § 107(d), 119 Stat. 462, 466 (2005) (“On
the date on which the Agreement ceases to be in force with respect to the United States, the
provisions of this Act (other than this subsection) and the amendments made by this Act shall
cease to have effect.”); United States-Australia Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub.
L. No. 108-286, § 106(c), 118 Stat. 919, 923 (2004) (“On the date on which the Agreement
terminates, the provisions of this Act (other than this subsection) and the amendments made by
this Act shall cease to be effective.”). The North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation
Act contains a similar, albeit somewhat less specific provision. See North American Free Trade
Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 103-182, § 109(b), 107 Stat. 2057, 2067–68 (1993)
(providing that “[d]uring any period in which a country ceases to be a NAFTA country, sections
101 through 106 shall cease to have effect with respect to such country”).
173. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.

192

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:1:151

trade policy, namely tariffs. But beginning with the Reciprocal Trade
Agreement Act of 1934, Congress has delegated to the president the
authority to set tariffs.174 There, Congress granted President Roosevelt
the authority to reduce tariffs in accordance with the terms of bilateral
trade agreements.175 Beginning with the Trade Expansion Act of 1962,
and later in the statutes implementing trade agreements like the WTO
Agreements or NAFTA, Congress granted the president the authority
to proclaim tariffs consistent with the United States’ international
commitments.176
Indeed, the core of statutes implementing trade agreements
consists of prescribing the rules regarding tariffs. The basic grant of
authority in such statutes provides that “[t]he President may proclaim
(1) such modifications or continuation of any duty, (2) such continuation
of duty-free or excise treatment, or (3) such additional duties, as the
President determines to be necessary or appropriate to carry out or
apply . . . the Agreement.”177 Implementing acts typically contain a
variety of other technical provisions regarding customs duties, as well
as provisions on “trade remedies.”178 These latter provisions authorize
the government to impose additional duties in certain circumstances in
which imports cause injuries to American industries.179
Depending on the trade agreement in question, implementing
legislation may contain a variety of other provisions as well. Because
174. See Kathleen Claussen, Trade’s Security Exceptionalism, 72 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming
2020) (manuscript at 16), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3439705
[https://perma.cc/NJL5-6B2A].
175. See Michael J. Hiscox, The Magic Bullet? The RTAA, Institutional Reform, and Trade
Liberalization, 53 INT’L ORG., 669, 671 (1999) (discussing Roosevelt’s Secretary of State’s efforts to
obtain the authority).
176. Meyer & Sitaraman, supra note 47, at 643 (“Up to and including the 2015 Bipartisan
Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act, Congress has granted the President ex ante
authority to enter into reciprocal tariff-reducing agreements and to proclaim tariffs on the basis of
such agreements.”).
177. United States–Korea Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 112-41,
§ 201(a), 125 Stat. 428, 432–33 (2011); see also Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103465, § 111(a), 108 Stat. 4809, 4819–20 (1994) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2902 (2012))
(granting the president similar authority with respect to the World Trade Organization).
178. See, e.g., §§ 201–208, 301, 311–16, 321, 331–38, 341, 125 Stat. at 428, 432–460 (discussing
customs provisions and relief from imports in the United States–Korea Free Trade Agreement
Implementation Act); §§ 201–10, 301, 311–16, 321–28, 331, 119 Stat. 467–95 (discussing customs
provisions and relief from imports in the Dominican Republic–Central America–United States
Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act).
179. Under WTO rules, countries are authorized to derogate from their WTO commitments in
order to countervail illegal subsidies, bring actions against exporters “dumping” their product (that
is, selling it at unfairly low prices), and temporarily limit imports in order to “safeguard” domestic
industries. See Anti-dumping, Subsidies, Safeguards: Contingencies, Etc., WORLD TRADE ORG.,
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm8_e.htm (last visited Dec. 26, 2019)
[https://perma.cc/6KEN-A5FJ] (describing antidumping actions, countervailing duties, and limits
on imports).
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U.S. tariffs are already so low, modern U.S. trade agreements are more
important for their regulatory effects. Consequently, the other
provisions in implementing legislation often involve delegations of
regulatory authority to the executive branch. These grants of authority
can allow significant room for the executive branch to change how trade
agreements are implemented without having to return to Congress.
Moreover, the existence of an international agreement provides both
another means to revise the implementation of trade policy as well as
an institutional vehicle to reinforce the executive branch’s commitment
to trade liberalization. No equivalent mechanism reinforces the
government’s commitment to adjustment assistance.
Rules for international dispute resolution illustrate the point.
Modern trade agreements all contain state-to-state dispute resolution
mechanisms.180 By far the most significant of these mechanisms is the
WTO’s Dispute Settlement Understanding (“DSU”), which provides for
the adjudication of trade disputes by panels and for appeals to the
WTO’s Appellate Body.181 Governments can and have used the DSU to
challenge regulations adopted by administrative agencies in the United
States. For instance, in the famous Shrimp-Turtle case, Malaysia,
Thailand, India, and Pakistan challenged a ban on the import of shrimp
into the United States that had not been caught using technology that
kept sea turtles safe.182 After the United States lost the case, the U.S.
State Department changed the governing regulations to comply with
the WTO Appellate Body’s decision.183 More recently, in the United
States–Country of Origin Labeling (“COOL”) case, Mexico and Canada
challenged U.S. statutes and regulations imposing labeling
requirements on beef and pork.184 Again, after the United States lost

180. See, e.g., KORUS, supra note 27, art. 22; Dominican Republic-Central America-United
States Free Trade Agreement art. 20, Aug. 5, 2004, 43 I.L.M. 514. Preferential trade agreements,
but not the WTO, also contain investor-state dispute settlement provisions that allow private
parties to bring cases directly against governments for violations of the investment provisions of
an agreement. See, e.g., NAFTA, supra note 27, at ch. 11, § B (providing for procedures governing
disputes between a party and “an investor of another party”).
181. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter Understanding on Rules
and Procedures] (establishing the Dispute Settlement Body).
182. See Appellate Body Report, United States–Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products, ¶ 1, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998).
183. See Appellate Body Report, United States–Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products: Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia, ¶ 31, WTO Doc.
WT/DS58/AB/RW (Oct. 22, 2001) (“The United States contends that it has proceeded to remedy
this aspect of unjustifiable discrimination identified by the Appellate Body.”).
184. See Appellate Body Report, United States–Certain Country of Origin Labelling (COOL)
Requirements, ¶ 1, WTO Doc. WT/DS386/AB/R (June 29, 2012).

194

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:1:151

the initial case, it responded by trying to change administrative
regulations to bring itself into compliance.185
Like changes to tariffs, these changes to administrative
regulations are authorized, within limits, by implementation acts. The
Uruguay Round Agreements Implementation Act explicitly
contemplates that the executive branch may change regulations in
response to adverse decisions from the WTO, provided that it notifies
and consults with Congress and engages in public notice and
comment.186 Such new regulations must still conform to ordinary
principles of administrative law. But the authority to regulate based on
the decisions of an international tribunal is a significant concession
from Congress. In a wide range of trade disputes, this authority will
permit the executive branch to modify U.S. regulations without
obtaining formal consent from Congress. To be sure, the consultation
provisions mean that members of Congress can pressure the executive
branch to regulate in ways they might prefer. And Congress of course
retains the ability to override executive branch regulations through
subsequent legislation. But barring such legislation, Congress has
acquiesced, on an indefinite basis, to the executive branch’s authority
to regulate in any area in order to bring the United States into
compliance with its trade liberalization obligations.
*

*

*

We can state the point more generally. Interdependent policy
instruments in which one instrument is a tax or regulatory program
and the other is a fiscal program are at a high risk of misalignment.
Regulatory laws—ones that directly govern the conduct of private
actors—can constitutionally be delegated to the executive branch and,
as a practical matter, usually are. Their ongoing implementation is
therefore negotiated and contested in an environment with relatively
low transaction costs. Regulations on market access, environmental
regulations, and price controls can all have indefinite durations.187 But
Congress cannot (as a constitutional matter) and does not (as a practical

185. See Appellate Body Report, United States–Certain Country of Origin Labelling (COOL)
Requirements: Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Canada and Mexico, ¶¶ 1.4–1.6, WTO Doc.
WT/DS386/AB/RW (May 18, 2015) (describing the USDA’s final rule complying with the DSB’s
initial recommendations).
186. See Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 123(g), 108 Stat. 4809, 4830–
31 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 3533 (2012)) (describing the process by which a department or agency
can amend regulations deemed inconsistent with the Agreements by a dispute settlement body).
187. Congress can, of course, also make them subject to sunsets or revisit them at any time it
wants.
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matter) delegate away responsibility for reauthorizing fiscal programs.
As a consequence, fiscal programs are almost always of limited duration
and can entail tremendous costs in their renewal.188 The result of this
disconnect is misalignment.
B. Welfare Implications
Misaligned lawmaking, which exists when these three factors—
interdependence, decoupling, and a lack of credible commitments—are
present, explains why eminent commentators like Paul Krugman,
Maurice Obstfeld, Gregory Mankiw, and Simon Lester are mistaken
when they argue that the costs of trade liberalization can be more
effectively dealt with outside of trade policy.189 Although they do not
conceive of it in this way, the “two-step” model for which they advocate
is essentially an argument for decoupling interdependent policies like
trade liberalization and trade adjustment assistance. Such decoupling,
the argument goes, is more efficient because it allows direct responses
to each policy problem.190
Their argument is right as far as it goes. If adjustment policies
kept pace with demands created by trade liberalization, using two
different policy instruments might make sense. But the argument for
keeping adjustment policy distinct from trade policy fails to take into
consideration the law and institutions through which these two
decoupled policies must pass. Lawmakers are not disinterested
technocrats making policy. They are politicians with varying
preferences. Moreover, legislators bargain over policies in an iterative
fashion, revisiting and revising legislation over time. The terms of an
initial legislative bargain can structure that future bargaining in a way
that affects outcomes. Decoupling may in theory enable more direct,
efficient policy responses. But completely separating two
interdependent issues—which is what occurs when interdependent,
decoupled policies are not renegotiated together—removes the

188. The recent shutdown of the government by the Trump Administration in an effort to
obtain funding for a border wall illustrates the point. See Steve Holland & Richard Cowan, Backing
Down, Trump Agrees to End Shutdown Without Border Wall Money, REUTERS (Jan. 25, 2019, 5:06
AM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-shutdown/backing-down-trump-agrees-to-endshutdown-without-border-wall-money-idUSKCN1PJ126 [https://perma.cc/L2ZU-RA76].
189. See KRUGMAN & OBSTFELD, supra note 14; Lester, supra note 16, at 414 (“But query
whether trade restrictions are really the best approach . . . to protect domestic labor
standards[ ].”); Mankiw, supra note 14.
190. See supra Section I.B.
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incentives for politicians who are bargaining to take into account the
costs created by interdependent policies.191
In other words, decoupling without making credible
commitments to renegotiate interdependent policies together can have
significant welfare consequences. The beneficiaries of provisions subject
to more frequent renegotiation are likely to enjoy the benefits for which
they bargained for a much shorter period of time than the beneficiaries
of policies not subject to renegotiation. Moreover, in seeking to extend
benefits for a program subject to renegotiation, advocates will
frequently have to bargain with less leverage than they had at the time
of the initial bargain. After all, the initial measure to which they lent
their support is not up for renegotiation.
To see how this bargaining dynamic plays out and its welfare
consequences, consider two constituencies bargaining over two policies,
trade liberalization and adjustment assistance. Imagine they strike a
bargain that lowers tariffs on a range of products in exchange for
funding adjustment assistance policies, such as job retraining and
relocation subsidies. Further imagine that the bargain is misaligned as
described above. Trade liberalization and labor market support in
import-competing sectors are interdependent. Increased market access
(i.e., lower trade barriers) hurts import-competing domestic industries,
creating a demand for labor market adjustment policies. Trade
liberalization and labor market support have also been decoupled
through the creation of adjustment assistance. Politicians can bargain
over a policy on trade liberalization and a policy on adjustment
assistance, which saps some of the political rationale for using tariffs as
a means of labor market support. Imagine also that legislators
authorize an indefinite reduction in tariffs, while authorizing trade
adjustment assistance for only five years.
In the first five years, both constituencies benefit from the
bargain. Absent legislative action, however, the bargain favors the side
whose policy choice is entrenched through an indefinite duration—here,
proponents of trade liberalization. Because those benefits are not
subject to renegotiation, they continue to accrue in successive years. On
the other hand, without renegotiation, proponents of adjustment
assistance will lose their benefits. If they (or more accurately their
representatives in Congress) do renegotiate, they can expect to see their
benefits cut unless they offer additional concessions, such as either a
191. See, e.g., Sallie James, Maladjusted: The Misguided Policy of “Trade Adjustment
Assistance,” CATO INST. 1 (Nov. 2007), https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/tbp026.pdf [https://perma.cc/W253-TVDT] (“The very existence of trade adjustment assistance
perpetuates the myth that freeing trade creates special ‘victims’ who deserve special programs
simply because of the reason for their unemployment.”).
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reduction in benefits under adjustment assistance or further trade
liberalization concessions. Their welfare from the initial deal thus
declines in later years.
In principle, these declines in one group’s welfare from a
legislative bargain might not concern us. Under basic economic theory,
rational parties to a bargain assess what they get in terms of its net
present value.192 In striking the deal, one party might receive all of its
benefits up front (TAA recipients), while the other party receives its
benefits over time (trade liberalization proponents). But both parties
should willingly make the agreement as long as, at the time of the
bargain, both sides sufficiently value the future stream of benefits. For
instance, if labor interests receive sufficient trade adjustment
assistance in the early years of a trade agreement to offset all of the
costs of trade liberalization going forward, then social welfare may well
be maximized through a misaligned bargain.
1. Misaligned Renegotiation in the Presence of Uncertainty
Three conditions, however, make it likely that a misaligned
bargain will both hurt the beneficiaries of a policy that must be
renegotiated as well as cause a drop in their social welfare.
First, the parties will often be uncertain about the exact
distribution of costs and benefits over time.193 That uncertainty can
mean that a party receives less, sometimes substantially less, from a
bargain than it expected to receive. For instance, a policy instrument
may not work as originally envisioned, or an economic shock might
cause the distribution of costs and benefits to be different from what the
parties initially imagined. The adversely affected party will seek to
renegotiate, but if the legislative bargain is misaligned, they will be at
a disadvantage in doing so.
More concretely, the actual costs from trade liberalization may
be greater in future periods than the parties initially anticipated, or
TAA’s effectiveness at helping labor transition may be lower. Labor
interests might, for instance, initially believe that trade adjustment
assistance policies are only necessary for a short period of time. If labor
markets adjust within five years, adjustment policies will no longer be
192. See, e.g., Carlo Alberto Magni, Investment Decisions, Net Present Value and Bounded
Rationality, 9 QUANTITATIVE FIN. 967, 967 (2009) (explaining that the net present value theory is
considered by most scholars a “theoretically sound” model).
193. See Barbara Koremenos, Loosening the Ties That Bind: A Learning Model of Agreement
Flexibility, 55 INT’L ORG. 289, 293 (2001) (indicating that distributional uncertainty is pervasive);
Timothy Meyer, Shifting Sands: Power, Uncertainty and the Form of International Legal
Cooperation, 27 EUR. J. INT’L L. 161, 175 (2016) (discussing the effect of uncertainty concerning
the distribution of costs and benefits upon state action).
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necessary. If labor markets continue to suffer from trade liberalization
policies adopted as part of the initial bargain, then TAA proponents will
wish to renegotiate to take account of new circumstances or new
information. They will, however, have given up their leverage in
negotiations if trade liberalization is not also up for renegotiation.
Notice that this uncertainty is a risk only for TAA proponents,
not for trade liberalization proponents. To see why, consider that if
either side does better than it expects, it has no incentive to renegotiate.
If adjustment costs are less than expected, the extra adjustment
assistance is a windfall for TAA proponents. Likewise, greater-thanexpected trade liberalization benefits are a bonus.
The consequences are not reciprocal, however, if the situation
turns out worse for one side. If the costs of trade liberalization turn out
to be greater than expected, TAA proponents must renegotiate in the
next period from a position of weakness. Since trade liberalization is
not under renegotiation, TAA proponents have limited leverage. By
contrast, if the benefits of trade liberalization come in lower than
expected, trade liberalization proponents can renegotiate when TAA
comes up for renegotiation—an event that is never far off. Because TAA
proponents have no future stream of benefits at that point, they too
should be willing to renegotiate. The policy uncertainty that is common
to the real world, then, represents an asymmetric risk when lawmaking
has been misaligned.
Empirically, economic data suggests that trade liberalization
has, in fact, been considerably more costly to particular communities
than anticipated.194 David Autor and his coauthors have shown that the
shock to some communities from China’s entrance to the WTO in 2001
was considerably more severe than previously thought and had not
abated even a decade later.195 Indeed, the development of the Chinese
economy since 2001 has continued to disrupt new industries years after
China joined the WTO. Over a decade after its 2001 accession, for
instance, China aggressively entered the market for renewable
energy.196 As a result, U.S. manufacturing workers who had retrained
for jobs in this emerging industry lost their jobs again as a result of

194. See Autor et al., supra note 125, at 235 (indicating that labor rates remain depressed in
certain localities for a full decade or more after trade shocks).
195. Id.
196. See Michael Slezak, China Cementing Global Dominance of Renewable Energy and
(Jan.
6,
2017,
4:00
AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/
Technology,
GUARDIAN
environment/2017/jan/06/china-cementing-global-dominance-of-renewable-energy-andtechnology [https://perma.cc/X9PL-SWXZ].
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competition with China.197 From a trade law perspective, however, this
later disruption arose not from a new trade agreement, but from an old
one—in this case, the agreement that allowed China to join the WTO.198
Significantly, existing WTO members must approve new WTO
members, but that process is controlled by the executive branch in the
United States.199 As a result, the executive branch can agree to expand
the United States’ international trade liberalization commitments by
expanding WTO membership without returning to Congress. Not
surprisingly, since Chinese accession did not formally require
congressional approval, no new TAA measure was passed directly in
response. Indeed, TAA was expanded in 1993 when the United States
joined NAFTA and again in 2002 when President Bush sought trade
promotion authority to negotiate new trade agreements.200 In the
interim, however, TAA received only a brief extension in the late 1990s,
followed by a lapse in 2001—the same year China entered the WTO.201
2. Agency Problems
Second, legislators’ incentives in lawmaking frequently diverge
from their constituents. Rational models of legislative behavior assume
197. See Crystalline Silicon Photovoltaic Cells (Whether or Not Partially or Fully Assembled
into Other Products), Inv. No. TA-201-75, USITC Pub. 4739, at 33–34 (Nov. 2017) (Final) (finding
“significant unemployment and underemployment” in the U.S. solar manufacturing sector due to
a dramatic increase in imports). This competition has, in turn, prompted a wave of trade remedies
cases against China. See Timothy Meyer, Free Trade, Fair Trade, and Selective Enforcement, 118
COLUM. L. REV. 491, 506–10 (2018) (discussing international challenges to China’s support for
renewable energy).
198. Protocol on China’s Accession, supra note 40.
199. Marrakesh Agreement art. XII (providing that new members of the WTO must be
approved by a vote of the existing members); Meyer & Sitaraman, supra note 47, at 616. China’s
admission to the WTO did mean that Congress voted to extend “permanent normal trade relations”
to China under U.S. law. See Nicholas R. Lardy, Permanent Normal Trade Relations for China,
BROOKINGS INST. 1 (May 2000), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/pb58.pdf
[https://perma.cc/L5LD-7G69] (anticipating the establishment of such relations). The JacksonVanik Amendment to the Trade Act of 1974 had purported to deny certain countries, including
China, most-favored-nation status. See Trade Act of 1974 § 402, 19 U.S.C. § 2432 (2012)
(restricting normal trade relations with nonmarket economy countries). China’s WTO accession
would require the United States to grant China most-favored-nation status, so in 2000, Congress
voted to grant that status to China permanently. Alan S. Alexandroff, Concluding China’s
Accession to the WTO: The U.S. Congress and Permanent Most Favored Nation Status for China,
3 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 23, 34–39 (1998); see Lardy, supra (discussing the
Congressional vote). This action by Congress may not have been strictly necessary. China had
actually enjoyed most-favored-nation relations with the United States since 1980 pursuant to
annual presidential waivers of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment authorized by that statute.
Frederick M. Abbott, China’s Accession to the WTO, 3 ASIL INSIGHTS 1 (Jan. 12, 1998),
https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/3/issue/1/chinas-accession-wto
[https://perma.cc/L3R8549Q].
200. See HORNBECK, supra note 24, at 10 (detailing TAA reauthorization events).
201. Protocol on China’s Accession, supra note 40; HORNBECK, supra note 24, at 10.
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that legislators pursue policies that advance their electoral prospects.202
We might expect constituents to lose out over time when legislators
receive electoral benefits from reaching a deal that does not serve the
long-term interests of their constituents. Misalignment can exacerbate
these agency problems by requiring repeated negotiations by legislators
plagued by these kinds of agency problems.
In the abstract, agency problems can pose difficulties for either
or both sides of a legislative bargain. Constituencies differ, however, in
their ability to monitor and sanction their representatives for not
adequately representing their interests. In general, collective action
problems mean that interests that are widely shared among
unorganized individuals will fare worse in the legislative process than
interests represented by organizations.203 Misaligned lawmaking
makes this problem worse when the less well-organized constituency is
also the one forced to renegotiate more frequently. More frequent
renegotiation creates greater monitoring demands. Absent adequate
monitoring and sanctioning of legislators, both the initial bargain and
each iterative negotiation make the disfavored interest groups worse off
than they would be in the absence of agency problems.204
The mechanisms through which support for trade liberalization
and trade adjustment assistance advance electoral prospects differ in
ways that create agency problems for proponents of trade adjustment
assistance. The business community provides the primary active
constituency in favor of trade liberalization.205 The business
community’s support manifests itself in the forms of lobbying and
financial contributions to campaigns. This lobbying strategy has been
so effective in recent decades that every U.S. presidential
administration between the end of World War II and the Trump
Administration pursued trade liberalization in one form or another.

202. DAVID MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 5–6 (2d ed. 2004); KRISTINA C.
MILLER, CONSTITUENCY REPRESENTATION IN CONGRESS: THE VIEW FROM CAPITOL HILL 8 (2010).
203. See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 48–51 (Schocken Books rev. ed.
1971) (1965) (describing how organizations provide selective benefits to members in order to solve
collective action problems).
204. See infra Part III.A.
205. Traditional views of the political economy of trade liberalization argue that end-use
consumers usually do not support trade liberalization especially vocally, even though collectively
they benefit enormously from it. The benefit each such consumer receives is too small to affect
their voting behavior or to cause them to organize. Recent polling data bears this out. A July 2016
poll, for instance, found that most respondents do not feel strongly about trade policy one way or
another. Among those that do have strong views, however, about three out of four oppose trade
liberalization, regardless of party affiliation. Tobias Konitzer, Sam Corbett-Davies & David
Rothschild, Who Cares About Free Trade? Not Many Americans, it Turns Out, WASH. POST (Jul.
29, 2016, 10:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/07/29/whocares-about-free-trade/ [https://perma.cc/7ZPB-M2GU].
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The business community is an especially effective monitor in
part because of the amount of money it can direct to legislators, but also
because it can organize itself more effectively through trade
associations like the U.S. Chamber of Commerce or the Pharmaceutical
Research and Manufacturers of America.206 Additionally, because the
business cycle often involves medium- to long-term investments, the
business community can afford to take a medium- to long-term view of
the benefits of trade liberalization. For instance, one of the major
criticisms of the Trump Administration’s positions during the recent
renegotiation of NAFTA centered on a proposed five-year sunset
clause.207 That time period, critics argue, was too short to allow effective
business planning, which suggests that businesses view the benefits of
trade liberalization as coming over a period of time substantially longer
than the proposed five-year window.208 Ultimately, the agreement
reached by the three NAFTA parties included a sixteen-year term
subject to renewal.209
On the other side of the equation, labor unions are the
organizations that most obviously represent constituents that would
benefit from trade adjustment assistance. Indeed, in 1962, George
Meany, the head of the AFL-CIO, enthusiastically endorsed the Trade
Expansion Act that first codified the exchange of support for trade
liberalization and trade adjustment assistance.210 This support
collapsed very quickly due to the difficulties with actually extracting
the benefits that trade adjustment assistance promised. Between 1962
and 1974, when Congress next considered TAA, the Labor Department

206. See Megan R. Wilson, Lobbying’s Top 50: Who’s Spending Big, HILL (Feb. 7, 2017, 6:00
AM), https://thehill.com/business-a-lobbying/business-a-lobbying/318177-lobbyings-top-50-whosspending-big [https://perma.cc/C8PJ-J5EE] (noting that these organizations were among the top
five spenders of lobbying dollars).
207. Andrew Mayeda, U.S. Wants Five-Year Sunset Provision for NAFTA, Ross Says,
BLOOMBERG (Sept. 14, 2017, 1:43 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-09-14/rosssays-u-s-wants-five-year-sunset-provision-for-nafta [https://perma.cc/B6VS-FXRL]; see Phil Levy,
Trump May Be About to Blow Up the NAFTA Talks, FORBES (Oct. 10, 2017, 8:25 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/phillevy/2017/10/10/nafta-round-4-brace-for-impact/
[https://perma.cc/C33U-MM3V].
208. Pinar Çebi Wilber, U.S. NAFTA Stance Makes for Good TV but Bad Policy, HILL (Oct. 24,
2017, 9:50 AM), http://thehill.com/opinion/finance/356839-us-nafta-stance-makes-for-good-tv-badpolicy [https://perma.cc/E76D-BZ4K] (“[R]elocations and consolidations [and other ways
businesses utilize and take advantage of NAFTA] require a stable economic environment and trust
in an agreement that guarantees the rules will not change . . . in the middle of the game.
[Businesses’] planning horizon is not five years.”). Ultimately, the renegotiated NAFTA included
a sixteen-year duration. See infra Part III.
209. Agreement Between the United States of America, the United Mexican States, and
Canada art. 34.7, ¶ 1, Nov. 30, 2018, [hereinafter NAFTA 2.0], https://ustr.gov/sites/default/
files/files/agreements/FTA/USMCA/Text/34_Final_Provisions.pdf [https://perma.cc/K3QT-RQ7C].
210. See Kapstein, supra note 91, at 507.

202

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:1:151

approved hardly any applications for trade adjustment assistance.
Indeed, the first successful application did not occur until November
1969.211 As a result, during the debate on the Trade Act of 1974, labor
interests had come to view TAA in practice as “burial insurance.”212
Yet labor unions have failed to generate support for reforming
TAA or correcting its misalignment problem. This reflects the welldocumented decline in the political influence of labor unions.213 Union
membership has fallen starkly since the 1970s. One source reports that
between 1970 and 2003, absolute union membership declined by over
11%, a net loss of about 2.5 million members.214 During the same period,
the U.S. population grew by almost 100 million people.215 As a result,
labor unions lack the political clout they once had. They therefore
cannot effectively advocate for changes to TAA or a realignment of
adjustment assistance policies with trade liberalization.
Labor unions also no longer command the support of their
members on trade politics. The 2016 U.S. presidential election
demonstrates labor’s difficulties. Labor unions by and large supported
the Democratic candidate, Hillary Clinton. Yet labor households failed
to turn out for Clinton.216 Lack of support among these labor households
helped turn a series of midwestern states such as Michigan and Ohio,
which had been considered a Democratic firewall, to the victorious
Republican candidate, Donald Trump. For instance, in Ohio, Trump
won union households by 9%.217 During the 2012 presidential election,
the same households had gone for President Obama over the
Republican nominee Mitt Romney by twenty-three points.218 In
Michigan, exit polls showed Clinton winning union households, but only
by 13% as against a 33% victory for President Obama four years
earlier.219

211. James A. Dorn, Trade Adjustment Assistance: A Case of Government Failure, 2 CATO J.
865, 873 (1982).
212. See Kapstein, supra note 91, at 509.
213. See ROBERT E. BALDWIN, THE DECLINE OF US LABOR UNIONS AND THE ROLE OF TRADE 2–
3 (2003); Dan Clawson & Mary Ann Clawson, What Has Happened to the US Labor Movement?
Union Decline and Renewal, 25 ANN. REV. SOC. 95, 97 (1999).
214. Jelle Visser, Union Membership Statistics in 24 Countries, 129 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 38,
45 tbl.3 (2006).
215. See US Population by Year, MULTPL, https://www.multpl.com/united-statespopulation/table/by-year (last visited Jan. 6, 2020) [https://perma.cc/Q9CF-7VDM].
216. Ted Hesson & Marianne Levine, Unions Investigate Their Poor Showing for Clinton,
POLITICO (Nov. 10, 2016, 10:48 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2016/11/labor-unions-hillaryclinton-mobilization-231223 [https://perma.cc/M4NA-HD8R].
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
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In other words, labor households broke with their leadership
during the 2016 election. Labor unions face declines in membership for
reasons unrelated to trade, but even those households that remain
union members increasingly supported the protectionist candidate,
Donald Trump. This increase in support for protectionism is
understandable if protectionist policies and adjustment assistance are
viewed as substitutes. The failure to produce an effective adjustment
assistance policy that sustainably coexists with trade liberalization
predictably pushes labor union voters towards protectionism.
Beyond these organizational problems, workers in communities
that are losing jobs and the social safety net long provided by companies
via generous benefit packages may prefer a short-term infusion of cash.
Other solutions, such as investment in infrastructure and education,
may help workers’ communities more in the long run. But such
solutions do little to provide them with immediate relief. In economic
terms, workers may have a high discount rate. Legislators can thus
claim victory by bringing home dollars to their districts today.
Misalignment makes this tendency worse because it trades the
immediate, but ultimately less helpful, payoff for the possibility of an
adjustment assistance policy that continues working for communities
over a longer period of time.
As a consequence, legislators have little incentive to push for
alignment between trade liberalization and trade adjustment
assistance. Trade liberalization’s political advocates tend to be business
communities that take a longer-term view than do voters that need
adjustment assistance. Voters, especially those that benefit most from
assistance, will tend to have shorter time horizons and are represented
by organizations that have contracted substantially in recent decades.
Responding to this incentive, rational legislators will bargain for highly
visible cash infusions that they can steer to their districts, rather than
hold out for more difficult concessions on long-term adjustment
assistance policies.
3. Potential Systemic Collapse
Misaligned lawmaking also creates the risk that both sides of
the misaligned bargain will ultimately be destabilized. Beneficiaries of
misalignment may benefit in the short run—getting their preferred
policies without having to agree to long-term policies to offset the costs
their policies create.220 But if the losers from misalignment become

220. See, e.g., James, supra note 191, at 4.
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convinced that they cannot win in the existing legal and policy
framework, they may try to blow the entire system up.
To see how, consider that no statutory program is completely
beyond renegotiation. Misaligned lawmaking changes how the
government renegotiates interdependent policies, forcing renegotiation
to happen more frequently and in a more costly institution for one
policy. But Congress, or in some cases the president, remain free to
revisit existing policies at any time if they so wish. Thus, even policies
insulated from frequent renegotiation can, at any time, become the
subject of renegotiation if the political will exists.
In the context of trade agreements, this means that if political
support for trade liberalization falls to sufficiently low levels, trade
liberalization—including existing trade agreements—may be in
jeopardy. The history of trade liberalization in the United States since
the end of the Cold War testifies to this fact. Presidents Clinton and
Obama both ran on “fair trade” platforms that called for reconsidering
and possibly renegotiating the terms of trade liberalization.221 Although
both took steps to improve the labor and environment chapters of trade
agreements, neither embraced a more holistic reconsideration of the
distributive problems trade liberalization helped create in the United
States.222
The resulting disenchantment of traditionally Democraticleaning labor voters partially explains the election of Donald Trump
and the current threat in which the modern trade regime finds itself. If
labor interests expect to be persistent losers in bargaining over trade
liberalization and adjustment policies, labor may decide to reject that
bargain in its entirety.223 They may decide, in effect, that they should
not support trade liberalization at all. If the complete lack of support

221. See Meyer, supra note 197, at 501–02; Laura Carlsen, Obama Reaffirms Promise to
Renegotiate NAFTA, HUFFPOST (Feb. 12, 2009, 5:12 AM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/obamareaffirms-promise-t_b_157316 [https://perma.cc/RZ98-52Q9].
222. Meyer, supra note 16, at 1026.
223. There is some debate about whether traditionally Democratic voters who voted for Donald
Trump did so out of concern about trade policy specifically, economic insecurity more generally, or
due to appeals to identity. Compare Diana C. Mutz, Status Threat, Not Economic Hardship,
Explains the 2016 Presidential Vote, 115 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. E4330, E4330 (2018)
(“Evidence points overwhelmingly to perceived status threat among high-status groups as the key
motivation underlying Trump support.”), with Stephen L. Morgan, Status Threat, Material
Interests, and the 2016 Presidential Vote, 4 SOCIUS 1, 12 (2018) (asserting that economic threats
were at least as important as the status threats identified by Mutz in motivating Trump’s support).
The key point, though, is that indicating support for protectionist trade policies allows a candidate
to signal sympathy with all three of these possible motivations. A platform of rolling back trade
liberalization signals disagreement with existing trade policy; sympathy with, and a plan of action
to respond to, the economic insecurity voters feel; and can also serve as a proxy for the distrust of
foreigners.
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leads to the demise of the international trading regime, the total social
costs of misalignment could become severe.
Data suggests that members of Congress have historically had
some awareness of the threat posed by ineffective adjustment
assistance policies. A recent study found that from 1980 to 2004,
members of Congress that represented districts with a larger number
of exporters—i.e., constituents that would benefit from trade
liberalization—were more likely to vote for adjustment assistance.224
The study found that “[e]xporters and their elected representatives
arguably support such expenditures [on adjustment assistance] in an
attempt to reduce opposition to free trade and broaden the protrade
coalition.”225 This finding verified what members of Congress
themselves have frequently noted: that adjustment assistance is critical
to obtain and maintain support for trade liberalization. Senator Max
Baucus, for instance, argued that adjustment assistance “can make an
important difference in public attitudes. Surveys show that most
American[s] feel a lot more comfortable with globalization, off-shoring
and trade when they know will get help if their jobs are threatened.”226
Senator Chuck Grassley similarly worried that losing adjustment
assistance for farmers hurt by trade liberalization would make it “very
hard for us to win Congressional support for new trade deals.”227
Previous empirical study has shown that this strategy is
effective. A 2011 study, for instance, found that voters in counties that
received trade adjustment assistance funding were less likely to oppose
pro-trade liberalization candidates.228 The corollary is that the absence
of trade adjustment assistance tended to increase opposition to protrade liberalization policies. Indeed, the same study found that “the
electoral impact associated with job losses due to foreign competition
was in fact larger than the swing needed to overturn the election’s
outcome” in at least one state during the 2004 presidential election.229
The 2016 election—in which razor thin majorities in states with
significant job losses due to foreign competition, such as Michigan,
Wisconsin, Ohio, and Pennsylvania, delivered the White House to
President Trump—suggests a similar phenomenon.230

224. Stephanie J. Rickard, Compensating the Losers: An Examination of Congressional Votes
on Trade Adjustment Assistance, 41 INT’L INTERACTIONS 46, 47 (2015).
225. Id.
226. Id. at 49–50.
227. See id. at 50 (quoting 150 CONG. REC. S4737, 4757 (2004) (statement of Sen. Coleman)).
228. See Yotam Margalit, Costly Jobs: Trade-Related Layoffs, Government Compensation, and
Voting in U.S. Elections, 105 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 166, 167 (2011).
229. Id.
230. Meyer, supra note 77, at 17.

206

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:1:151

In other words, trade adjustment assistance provides necessary
political support for trade liberalization. Without trade adjustment
assistance, the great gains that trade liberalization provides are also in
jeopardy. Yet neither members of Congress nor scholarly commentators
have paid sufficient attention to the way in which the law structures
that relationship. Misalignment makes it politically more difficult to
provide trade adjustment assistance because it separates the process of
approving such assistance from the process of approving the trade
agreements that such assistance supports. In so doing, misalignment
creates a critical threat to modern trade liberalization.
*

*

*

Misalignment has severe welfare consequences, as this Part has
demonstrated. It means that two sides to a legislative bargain benefit
unequally over time. Moreover, the side that gets the short end of the
long-term deal will increasingly advocate for the deal’s demise.
Misalignment thus represents a threat to the sustainability of policies,
such as trade liberalization, that require ongoing support among the
electorate. How do we rebuild that support and align trade adjustment
policies with trade liberalization? I turn to that question in the next
Part.
III. ALIGNING TRADE LIBERALIZATION WITH ADJUSTMENT
Trade liberalization has been one of the major forces for good in
the post–World War II era. It has lifted millions of people out of poverty,
encouraged innovation and technological advancement, and helped
establish peace after a half century of conflict. Yet, as current events
testify, liberalized trade is at risk. Rescuing it requires grappling with
the structural problems in trade policy that have led us to this juncture.
In this Part, I apply the normative Misalignment Thesis to trade. The
normative Misalignment Thesis states that when political stability
rests upon respecting the terms of a legislative bargain made across two
or more issues, those issues should be renegotiated and implemented
on the same timelines and in the same institutions. As discussed in Part
II, absent such alignment, one plank of the legislative bargain is likely
to lose ground over time. In some situations, these losses may not have
larger significance. When, however, proponents of the losing policy
continue to wield political power, they may use their influence to
undermine the winning plank. As a result, neither plank is sustainable
in the long term. Aligning the two planks in terms of renegotiation and
implementation can ensure the long-term stability of both planks.
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I propose three solutions to align trade liberalization with the
redistribution that trade liberalization makes necessary. First,
commitments to redistribute the gains from trade could be included
directly in trade agreements (Section III.A). Second, trade agreements
could include sunset provisions, aligning their time limits with the time
limits on domestic trade adjustment assistance programs (Section
III.B). Third, trade adjustment assistance funds could be distributed
through mechanisms that do not require constant renegotiation and
reauthorization, such as tax expenditures (Section III.C).
A. Internationalizing Obligations to Address
Trade-Related Inequality
International trade law pressures states to open their economies
without similarly pressuring them to provide the adjustment assistance
that makes trade liberalization politically sustainable.231 As a
consequence, international law privileges trade liberalization
commitments, providing additional legal process and diplomatic
avenues to enforce such commitments. To correct this misalignment,
governments should enshrine adjustment assistance commitments
directly in their trade agreements. This could be done in the form of an
“economic development” chapter within trade agreements. An
Economic Development Chapter would have three key features. 232
First, the Economic Development Chapter would create a
committee of experts charged with gathering data on communities,
regions, and sectors of member states’ economies adversely affected by
trade. Indeed, a development chapter in the Comprehensive and
Progressive Trans Pacific Partnership (“CPTPP”) (as the TPP was
renamed after the United States walked away from it) already creates
such a committee.233 Member states would also report to the committee
the measures they have taken to provide assistance to communities
adversely affected by trade liberalization. This softer monitoring effort
would resemble the reporting and monitoring mechanisms under
human rights treaties. While it would not result in sanctions, it would
provide information and feedback that could nudge states to take
greater action.

231. See supra Section II.A.
232. For a greater exposition as to what an Economic Development Chapter might look like,
see Meyer, supra note 16, at 1012–23.
233. Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership art. 23.7, Mar.
8, 2018, [hereinafter CPTPP], https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreementsaccords-commerciaux/agr-acc/tpp-ptp/text-texte/23.aspx [https://perma.cc/4AXV-S7T8].
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Second, the Economic Development Chapter would require
states to take affirmative steps to provide adjustment assistance to
adversely affected communities and individuals. As Gregory Shaffer
and Nicolas Lamp note, developing countries originally sought similar
provisions in GATT negotiations in the 1940s.234 They sought these
provisions precisely because they did not think that developed
countries’ commitments to provide greater market access would be
politically stable absent adjustment assistance.235 The Misalignment
Thesis provides the theoretical justification for this intuition.
The Economic Development Chapter should require
governments to commit “new money” to adjustment assistance
programs in proportion to the degree of adverse effects they report to
the Development Committee pursuant to their reporting obligations.
The requirement that states commit “new money” ensures that
governments do not simply count programs that already exist. Instead,
after a finding that a community or region has suffered as a result of
trade liberalization, governments would have to adopt new measures
that directly respond to their findings. These requirements should be
indexed so that they rise and fall with the degree of economic harm
suffered as a result of trade liberalization. Amending trade agreements
is difficult, so this indexing—which could be done in a number of
different ways—ensures that the Economic Development Chapter
continues to require financial assistance so long as it is necessary.
Equally importantly, if the gains from trade are distributed evenly, the
indexing would ensure that the obligation to provide assistance
naturally sunsets.
Critically, the Economic Development Chapter should provide
significant flexibility to states in terms of the kinds of programs that
would qualify. Domestic TAA programs would, for instance, certainly
count. But increased spending on a general social safety net should
qualify also. So too would additional spending on education and
investment in infrastructure, two areas in which public investment can
most directly create economic opportunity. Indeed, these latter two
priorities are already reflected in the CPTPP’s development chapter.236
The Economic Development chapter I propose here thus builds on an
existing blueprint already agreed to by negotiators from twelve

234. See Shaffer, supra note 14, at 25 n.161 (“[D]eveloping countries attempted to include
provisions in the GATT regarding developed countries’ adjustment policies, hoping that this would
reduce the pressure on developed country governments to erect barriers to developing countries’
imports. I thank Nicolas Lamp for this point.”).
235. See id.
236. CPTPP, supra note 233, ch. 23.
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countries, although it greatly expands it by requiring the imposition of
binding commitments.
Third, solving the alignment problem requires that the
Economic Development Chapter’s obligations be subject to the same
state-to-state enforcement procedures as the rest of a trade agreement,
including existing chapters on labor and environmental standards. In
this way, an Economic Development Chapter would provide an
international enforcement mechanism that would help ensure that
individual nations honor their commitment to help those harmed by
trade liberalization. If a nation failed to honor its development
obligations, it could be subject to retaliation by other members and the
suspension of concessions equal to the level of benefits the government
failed to provide.237
One might reasonably ask why Mexico, for instance, would bring
a trade case because the United States failed to implement domestic
TAA provisions that benefit U.S. workers. To be sure, it seems unlikely
that nations would bring many cases in order to assist foreign workers.
But it isn’t impossible to imagine. As developing countries’ efforts to
include adjustment assistance obligations in the original GATT attest,
developing countries understand that the political stability of market
access hinges on effective adjustment assistance.238 Moreover, countries
do sometimes bring cases to help foreign workers. In 2011, for example,
the United States brought a case under CAFTA against Guatemala for
labor violations that Guatemala committed against its own workers.239
That case, and the greater enforcement of labor and environmental
rights it represented, reflected part of the political bargain known as
the “May 10 Consensus,” a 2007 deal between the George W. Bush
Administration and Congress that led to the approval of a number of
twenty-first-century trade agreements.240 Enforcement of these
outward-looking obligations, in other words, is already part of the
bargain necessary to approve new trade agreements domestically.

237. See, e.g., Understanding on Rules and Procedures, supra note 181, art. 22.4 (“The level of
the suspension of concessions or other obligations authorized by the [Dispute Settlement Body]
shall be equivalent to the level of the nullification or impairment.”).
238. See Shaffer, supra note 14, at 25 n.161.
239. In 2017, the panel ruled against the United States. See In the Matter of Guatemala––
Issues Relating to the Obligations Under Article 16.2.1(a) of the CAFTA-DR, OFF. U.S. TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE
¶ 594
(2017),
https://www.trade.gov/industry/tas/Guatemala%20%20–
%20Obligations%20Under%20Article%2016-2-1(a)%20of%20the%20CAFTADR%20%20June%2014%202017.pdf [https://perma.cc/DV6K-XLJT].
240. See Trade Facts: Bipartisan Trade Deal, OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (2007),
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/factsheets/2007/asset_upload_file127_11319.pdf
[https://perma.cc/84JJ-C5BS].
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Beyond the stability of the trading system, states might believe
that bringing development cases is in their own self-interest for a
number of other reasons. A Mexican case against the United States
might benefit Mexican Americans, while a similar case by the United
States against Mexico might improve working conditions in Mexico and
thereby stem illegal immigration into the United States. Trade cases
are also often brought on a tit-for-tat basis, with a trade case by Country
A against Country B prompting a case by Country B against Country
A.241 In this context, a nation might bring a development case purely for
leverage in negotiations. Despite this cynical motive, such a case could
still lead to higher levels of adjustment assistance.
B. Utilizing Sunset Clauses in Trade Agreements
A second possibility is to include sunset clauses or periodic
review mechanisms in trade agreements. A sunset clause is one that
causes a legal regime to automatically expire if lawmakers do not take
affirmative action to extend the legal rules.242 By setting up a legal cliff,
sunset clauses encourage lawmakers to renegotiate around the
extension of a legal regime. If an Economic Development Chapter solves
the alignment problem by making both trade liberalization and
adjustment policies indefinite and subject to international process, a
sunset clause aligns trade liberalization and adjustment assistance
commitments by putting them both up for renegotiation, ideally in the
same domestic institutions and on the same timelines. Each
renegotiation of trade liberalization commitments would therefore
involve an opportunity to revisit the necessary degree of trade
adjustment assistance.
The idea that trade rules should be the subject of periodic
renegotiation is one as old as the Republic. In his farewell address,
George Washington counseled his successors to
establish[ ] with powers so disposed . . . conventional rules of intercourse, the best that
present circumstances and mutual opinion will permit, but temporary, and liable to be
from time to time abandoned or varied, as experience and circumstances shall dictate.243

Using sunset clauses to incentivize renegotiation in both
domestic and international regimes is also quite common. Domestic
241. See, e.g., Thomas J. Prusa & Susan Skeath, The Economic and Strategic Motives for
Antidumping Filings, 138 REV. WORLD ECON. 389, 411 (2002) (finding evidence of tit-for-tat trade
cases in the context of antidumping disputes).
242. See Timothy Meyer, Power, Renegotiation, and Exit Costs in International Law, 51 HARV.
INT’L L.J. 379, 396 (2010).
243. George Washington, U.S. President, Farewell Address (Sept. 19, 1796),
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/washing.asp [https://perma.cc/63YM-7MHA].
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legislation frequently contains sunset provisions that limit the duration
of particular rules. Examples include certain aspects of the USA
PATRIOT Act governing surveillance,244 the assault weapons ban,245
and tax cuts passed through budget reconciliation, which are limited to
ten years.246 Internationally, sunset clauses appear in agreements as
diverse as the nuclear nonproliferation treaty247 and the Kyoto Protocol
on climate change.248 These clauses are included specifically to promote
renegotiation in light of new information gleaned by the parties249 or
changed circumstances.250 Renegotiation is even quite common in
international economic law. India’s new model investment treaty, for
instance, contains a ten-year sunset clause.251
Despite the prevalence of sunset provisions in domestic and
international law, sunset clauses have been used only sparsely in trade
agreements. Perhaps the first significant use of such a clause is in the
new NAFTA 2.0 (the so-called United States–Mexico–Canada
Agreement or “USMCA”).252 That provision limits the NAFTA 2.0 to a
sixteen-year term unless all three parties agree to extend the term of
the agreement.253 Unlike other sunset provisions, the new NAFTA
provision is designed to ensure that states do not have to make the
renewal decision at, or even near, the time the agreement would expire.
Instead, NAFTA 2.0 calls for the parties to make the extension decision
244. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 224, 115 Stat. 272, 295.
245. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 110105,
108 Stat. 1796, 2000.
246. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 901,
115 Stat. 38, 150.
247. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons art. X.2, July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483,
729 U.N.T.S 161 (“Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be
convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force . . . .”).
248. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 3,
Dec. 11, 1997, 2302 U.N.T.S. 162 (creating a first commitment period to run from 2008 to 2012,
with subsequent commitment periods subject to further negotiation).
249. Koremenos, supra note 193, at 293; Meyer, supra note 193, at 163.
250. Meyer, supra note 242, at 387–88. (arguing that renegotiation provisions are often
designed to allow states to renegotiate in the event of power shifts).
251. Model Text for the Indian Bilateral Investment Treaty, MYGOV art. 24.1 (2016),
https://www.mygov.in/sites/default/files/master_image/Model%20Text%20for%20the%20Indian%
20Bilateral%20Investment%20Treaty.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2VAU-79MX].
International
investment agreements often include other kinds of provisions requiring states to renegotiate their
investment obligations over time, to accommodate a desire by countries to liberalize their
economies gradually. See Timothy Meyer & Tae Jung Park, Renegotiating International
Investment Law, 21 J. INT’L ECON. L. 655 (2018). Even the GATT permits states to renegotiate
their tariff concessions every three years. GATT, supra note 52, art. XXVIII, 55 U.N.T.S. at 276–
78.
252. NAFTA 2.0, supra note 209, art. 34.7, ¶ 1. As of the time of writing, NAFTA 2.0 remains
under consideration in the legislatures of all three member states.
253. Id.
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six years into the sixteen-year term, reducing the political theater
around an extension or sunset decision that would have prompt
effect.254
This sunset provision has prompted significant pushback. Simon
Lester and Inu Manak, for instance, have argued that the “new
NAFTA’s sunset clause is one of the most convoluted and unnecessary
provisions ever seen in a trade agreement.”255 Former U.S. Trade
Representative Michael Froman argued that the sunset clause deters
investment in Mexico by creating legal uncertainty about NAFTA’s
future.256 During negotiations, Canada in particular objected strongly
to the inclusion of a sunset provision, although it eventually agreed to
it.257
Contrary to widespread opinion among commentators and even
states like Canada, sunset clauses similar to NAFTA 2.0’s are a good
idea, both for trade liberalization commitments in general and for the
purpose of aligning trade adjustment assistance provisions with trade
liberalization provisions. A sixteen-year duration is long enough to give
businesses sufficient certainty that an investment made today in a
foreign country will be protected and have value, even if there is some
risk of the agreement sunsetting in the future.258 Allowing renewal to
occur at any point during the last ten years of the agreement’s term also
provides ample time and opportunity for negotiations to take place
around revisions to the agreement. Trade negotiators can revisit trade
agreements at any point during the agreement’s life cycle and reap the
benefits of greater stability that flow from a successful agreement.
At the same time, having to renegotiate will ensure that
proponents of adjustment assistance retain ongoing leverage over these
negotiations. If they are not satisfied with the package of adjustment
policies they are receiving, they can withhold support for extending the

254. If one party does not agree to extend NAFTA 2.0 at the six-year review, the parties have
a chance to renew the agreement each year for the next decade. Id. art. 34.7, ¶ 4.
255. Simon Lester & Inu Manak, New NAFTA’s Sunset Clause Is a Ticking Time Bomb, HILL
(Nov. 7, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://thehill.com/opinion/finance/415290-new-naftas-sunset-clause-is-aticking-time-bomb [https://perma.cc/AJC3-KA87].
256. NAFTA Sunset Clause ‘Creating Uncertainty,’ Ex-Trade Rep. Says, BLOOMBERG POL.
(July 25, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=egV_qJuDMAg [https://perma.cc/JT9MD6SV].
257. Lester & Manak, supra note 255 (discussing the sunset clause in the final, agreed text of
NAFTA 2.0); Katie Simpson, Canada and U.S. Clash over Sunset Clause in ‘Forceful’ NAFTA
Talks, CBC NEWS (Apr. 25, 2018, 3:03 PM), https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canada-us-sunsetclause-1.4635056 [https://perma.cc/VH6J-7T44].
258. The Trump Administration’s initial proposal was for a five-year sunset, which would
likely have been too short to create sufficient certainty. See supra notes 207–208 and
accompanying text.

2020]

MISALIGNED LAWMAKING

213

trade agreement.259 The sunset thus magnifies the bargaining power of
adjustment policy supporters by allowing them to link support for
existing trade liberalization policies, as well as new trade liberalization
proposals, to the extension and modernization of trade adjustment
assistance.
As this Article goes to print, Congress appears poised to pass
implementing legislation for NAFTA 2.0.260 Before it does so, and
certainly in legislation implementing future trade agreements,
Congress should seek two additional changes. First, Congress should
demand tighter alignment between adjustment assistance and future
extension of NAFTA. In particular, Article 34.7, the sunset and review
provision, could be amended to require states to revisit their domestic
adjustment policies as part of the extension decision. Even better,
Congress could pass adjustment assistance programs in connection
with approving NAFTA 2.0 that could be authorized, with money
appropriated, for so long as NAFTA 2.0 remains in effect. In this way,
a decision to extend NAFTA 2.0 would operate as an automatic
extension of TAA.
C. Reducing Renegotiation at the Domestic Level
A third solution would be to reduce the amount of renegotiation
over trade adjustment assistance at the domestic level. This would
solve, or at least reduce, the alignment problem by making both trade
liberalization and adjustment assistance commitments indefinite (or at
least of lengthy duration).
Removing the need to renegotiate could be accomplished in
several ways. First, Congress could authorize and appropriate money
for adjustment policies on a considerably longer time horizon. As
mentioned above, Congress does sometimes indefinitely appropriate
funds for programs, although these programs tend to have dedicated
funding sources such as gifts or fees. Congress could, of course, create
such a dedicated fund by earmarking certain fees to fund adjustment
assistance or by imposing a tax, the revenue from which would be

259. During negotiations with Congress, the Trump Administration signaled a willingness to
reform and possibly expand TAA in order to obtain approval for NAFTA 2.0. The US Labor
Department Announced Plans on Wednesday To Update And Streamline An Assistance Program
Designed To Help Workers Who Lose Their Jobs Due to Competition with Foreign Companies, INT’L
BUS. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2019, 11:21 AM), https://www.ibtimes.com/us-labor-department-announcedplans-wednesday-update-streamline-assistance-program-2860988 [https://perma.cc/67D3-A4T5].
260. Mauldin & Andrews, supra note 4.
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indefinitely appropriated to fund adjustment assistance programs.261
Indeed, Congress adopted the former approach to fund a trust for trade
adjustment assistance in the 1974 Trade Act.262 A dedicated tax
connected to trade agreements—either in the form of a financial
transaction tax or a transaction on the sectors expected to profit from
trade liberalization—could fund long-term adjustment assistance
appropriations.263
In fact, in the wake of the thirty-five-day government shutdown
in early 2019, Congress took steps to provide perpetual funding for the
government in the event negotiations over government funding break
down. Legislators introduced bills that would continue to fund the
government at existing levels in the event a new appropriations bill
could not pass.264 Congress, or legislatures in other countries, could pass
similar backstops in the event of a failure to renegotiate adjustment
assistance obligations. This kind of backstop would ensure that
adjustment assistance does not lapse due to a failure of political
bargaining, as it did under the Reagan Administration.265
Of course, Congress already possesses the ability to appropriate
money for longer periods of time but has chosen not to do so.
Consequently, tax expenditures may offer a more realistic way to
address trade adjustment assistance. A tax expenditure is a
“departure[ ] from the normal tax structure . . . designed to favor a
particular industry, activity, or class of persons.”266 Unlike direct
spending, tax expenditures are not subject to constant re-appropriation.

261. See Frank J. Garcia & Timothy Meyer, Restoring Trade’s Social Contract, 116 MICH. L.
REV. ONLINE 78, 96 (2017) (discussing how a financial transaction tax (“FTT”) on specified
transactions could be earmarked for, and adequately fund, adjustment assistance).
262. See Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 245, 88 Stat. 1978, 2026–27 (1975) (codified
as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2317 (2012)) (establishing an “Adjustment Assistance Trust Fund”).
263. See TIMOTHY MEYER & GANESH SITARAMAN, A BLUEPRINT FOR A NEW AMERICAN TRADE
POLICY 35–36 (2018), https://greatdemocracyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/NewAmerican-Trade-Policy-Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/G29P-VFBY] (proposing coupling trade
agreements with a “winners tax” which would tax sectors predicted to profit from the agreement
in order to create a Trade Adjustment Fund, or in the alternative, imposing an FTT throughout
the area covered by the trade agreement).
264. Carl Hulse, With Pain Still Fresh, Lawmakers Make Push to Outlaw Shutdowns, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 26, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/26/us/politics/government-shutdownlegislation.html [https://perma.cc/RL5D-HFVX]. These bills typically reduce the funding gradually
over time in order to create pressure to reach an agreement. Such a gradual drawdown might not
be appropriate in the case of adjustment assistance. In the case of the shutdown, government
funding is typically being held hostage for a largely unrelated priority, such as President Trump’s
border wall. Where adjustment assistance is concerned, the level of adjustment assistance itself is
the issue over which the parties are bargaining.
265. See supra Section I.C.2.
266. Leonard E. Burman, Is the Tax Expenditure Concept Still Relevant?, 56 NAT’L TAX J. 613,
613 (2003).
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Instead, because they take the form of exemptions from taxes, Congress
only needs to write them into the tax code once.
The tax code could, for instance, give workers laid off due to
trade liberalization refundable tax credits for relocation and retraining
expenses.267 Alternatively, since laid-off workers will often not have
significant income, the credit could be tradeable. Workers would thus
be able to exchange the tax credit that they cannot use for cash that
someone else can use.268 Firms could also be given tax credits for hiring
workers who have been laid off for trade-related reasons (or, to make
administering the program easier, in communities that have been
certified as trade-impacted). Such tax credits would make rehiring and
retraining workers cheaper than otherwise. From a labor market
standpoint, such credits may privilege the least competitive workers.
However, they would give businesses an incentive to improve those
workers’ skill sets and, more importantly, would be an acceptable form
of redistribution within the labor market from those who benefit from
trade liberalization to those that have been hurt. If a dramatic
expansion of the social safety net does not seem feasible, these kinds of
second-best options may be more viable strategies.
Again, the use of the tax code to provide adjustment assistance
has precedent. In the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Congress created tax
credits for investors to invest in designated “Opportunity Zones” within
the United States.269 This legislation provides a ready model for how
the tax code could incentivize investment in communities adversely
impacted by trade. Expansion of the credit to firms that hire workers
certified as adversely impacted by trade liberalization would provide a
further incentive for private firms to provide adjustment assistance.
Like the Opportunity Zones in the 2017 Act, this use of tax credits also
has broader political appeal than direct expenditures. Although both
tax expenditures and direct expenditures reduce federal revenue, tax
expenditures can be presented as a tax cut, making it easier to build a
coalition that will support them in Congress. In addition to solving the

267. This kind of program would require some definition of who has been laid off due to trade
liberalization. However, existing adjustment assistance programs already have definitions and
procedures for determining whether workers have been laid off for qualifying reasons. Eligibility
criteria and procedures could be borrowed from these programs.
268. In some states, for instance, the tax benefits from creating a conservation easement are
transferable in this way. See DEBRA PENTZ, ROMAN GINZBURG & RUTH MCMILLEN, STATE
CONSERVATION
TAX
CREDITS:
IMPACT
AND
ANALYSIS
10–15
(2007),
http://www.taxcreditexchange.com/documents/StateConservationTaxCreditsImpactandAnalysis.
pdf [https://perma.cc/3DZD-WGVJ] (analyzing the benefits of making tax credits from conservation
easements transferable).
269. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2184 (to be codified at I.R.C.
§ 1400Z-2).
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alignment problem by reducing renegotiation of an adjustment
assistance program, this political attractiveness is a significant point in
favor of the use of tax expenditures to provide adjustment assistance.
*

*

*

The misalignment in U.S. trade policy between trade
liberalization and trade adjustment assistance threatens to undo
decades of economic progress, hurting American consumers and
workers in export-oriented industries without significantly aiding
workers and industries hurt by trade liberalization. Realignment is
thus necessary to preserve the gains of trade liberalization and
vindicate Congress’s promise to American workers. As this Part has
suggested, a variety of options exist to realign American trade policy.
Congress’s (nearly concluded) consideration of NAFTA 2.0, as well as
any trade negotiations undertaken after the 2020 presidential election,
offer the perfect opportunity to test which ones are politically viable.
IV. MISALIGNED LAWMAKING: EXTENSIONS
The Misalignment Thesis is generalizable beyond the trade
context. One way to understand the Misalignment Thesis is as an
explanation for the (perhaps unintended) negative consequences of
deregulation that often occur, as well as a normative prescription for
how to regulate or deregulate without causing these unintended
consequences. Specifically, the Misalignment Thesis predicts that,
when the conditions described in Part II are met, deregulation will
harm certain constituencies even when policies are put in place to offset
those harms. Unless those new policies are legally coupled to existing
regulatory frameworks so that the two sets of policies continue to be
negotiated together, the new policies are likely to receive inadequate
government support over time.270 Normatively, this suggests that
legislators should couple interdependent policies—either by forgoing
deregulation or by creating credible commitments to negotiate
interdependent policies together.271 In this Part, I briefly discuss this
insight from the Misalignment Thesis and its application to debates
about deregulation in the domestic regulatory context, setting the stage
for future research.

270. Of course, if the offsetting policies enjoy majority support on their own, decoupling will
not lead to this problem.
271. One important countervailing pressure on lawmakers is to reduce the transaction costs
of lawmaking. Decoupling can achieve that by allowing lawmakers to address one policy area.
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To see how this more general application of the thesis works,
consider that when the government wishes to encourage certain kinds
of private conduct by the market, it can do so in at least two general
ways. First, it can tax or regulate private conduct to encourage the
behavior it wants. Second, it can directly subsidize the private conduct
it wants to encourage.
The former approach creates what we might call regulatory
subsidies. The government does not directly provide cash to a private
entity. Instead, it uses its taxing or regulatory power to encourage
private parties to do so.272 High trade barriers provide an example of a
regulatory subsidy. As discussed in Part I, high trade barriers
encourage domestic consumers to purchase domestically produced
goods instead of imported goods. Tariffs, for instance, make imported
goods more expensive, causing consumers to spend their money on
domestically produced goods that become relatively cheaper.
Regulations that constrict the supply of imports likewise turn
consumers to domestically produced alternatives.
Regulatory subsidies of this kind are found throughout the U.S.
economy, not only in trade. In areas as diverse as postal service,273
telecommunications,274 housing,275 airline regulation,276 healthcare,277

272. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Taxation by Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 22,
45 (1971).
273. See, e.g., J. Gregory Sidak, Maximizing the U.S. Postal Service’s Profits from Competitive
Products, 11 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 617, 644 (2015) (explaining that the Postal Service
receives “many privileges and implicit subsidies”); Chris Matthews, American Taxpayers Give an
$18 Billion Gift to the Post Office Every Year, FORTUNE (Mar. 27, 2015),
http://fortune.com/2015/03/27/us-postal-service/ [https://perma.cc/2R48-BEJQ] (explaining that
the Postal Service receives regulatory subsidies through laws barring other services from direct
delivery of mail to residential and business mailboxes, tax breaks, and other toll or fee exemptions,
and the ability to cheaply borrow from the U.S. Treasury).
274. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (establishing the Universal Service Fund, a system of
subsidies and fees intended to promote universal access to telecommunication services); Universal
Service, FED. COMM. COMM’N, https://www.fcc.gov/general/universal-service (last updated Dec. 20,
2019) [https://perma.cc/V8S4-P47F].
275. See Harvey S. Rosen, Housing Subsidies: Effects on Housing Decisions, Efficiency, and
Equity 28 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 1161, 1983),
https://www.nber.org/papers/w1161 [https://perma.cc/GZ64-R9EG] (explaining that tax code
provisions which have the effect of lowering the cost of home ownership are commonly known as
“implicit subsid[ies]”).
276. Christine Chmura, The Effects of Airline Regulation, FOUND. FOR ECON. EDUC. (Aug. 1,
1984), https://fee.org/articles/the-effects-of-airline-regulation/ [https://perma.cc/K49G-JYVB];
Essential Air Service, supra note 134.
277. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.); Svetlana Pashchenko & Ponpoje
Porapakkarm, Cross-Subsidization in Employer-Based Health Insurance and the Effects of Tax
Subsidy Reform, 69 NAT’L TAX J. 583, 599 (2016) (noting that the ACA creates sizeable cross-
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and even monetary policy,278 the government has used its authority to
provide regulatory subsidies to certain groups.279 In areas outside of
trade, the government often requires businesses to charge some
consumers higher prices for goods and services, often substantially
above the competitive prices for such products, while mandating that
other consumers can purchase the same goods and services below cost.
The premium paid by the first group provides an indirect subsidy to the
second group.280
During the latter half of the twentieth century and the early
twenty-first century, Congress deregulated many of these industries.
Just as in trade, Congress often accompanied this deregulation with
direct subsidies designed to offset the negative consequences of
deregulation. In effect, Congress decoupled the general regulation of the
market for a particular good or service from an interdependent policy
objective. In many domestic contexts, such as transportation, postal
service, or healthcare, the decoupled objective is universal access to the
good or service. In many of these cases, the direct subsidies have been
inadequate to continue to ensure access to the good or service.281
Two brief examples—federal regulation of transportation and
healthcare—illustrate. Nineteenth-century railroad charters required
railroad companies to serve specific routes and forbade them from

subsidization from people with low expected medical costs (the young and healthy) to people with
high expected medical costs (the old and unhealthy)).
278. See Morgan Ricks, Money as Infrastructure, 2018 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 757, 797–98 (2018)
(explaining that commercial banks receive a regulatory subsidy through a favorable administered
rate of interest on their accounts with the Federal Reserve, and as a whole, received $7 billion in
interest payments in 2015).
279. Just as in trade, the regulatory subsidy often comes in the form of price regulation.
However, domestic regulatory subsidies often involve more direct price controls than trade policy,
where tariffs or other trade barriers merely influence the price rather than mandate it. Direct
regulation in domestic economic regulation is often paired with regulatory barriers to entry.
Absent such barriers, regulating the price of existing providers is ineffective, because new entrants
will simply undercut the government-established price. See Richard A. Posner, Exclusionary
Practices and the Antitrust Laws, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 506, 532 (1974) (arguing that firms with
monopoly power should be allowed to reduce prices to meet new entry competition, subject to longrun marginal cost and intent to exclude requirements).
280. This phenomenon is often described as cross-subsidization. John Brooks, Brian Galle &
Brendan Maher, Cross-Subsidies: Government’s Hidden Pocketbook, 106 GEO. L.J. 1229, 1235–36
(2018).
281. A number of scholars have defended regulatory subsidies as a relatively efficient means
of redistribution. See id. at 1249 (arguing that cross-subsidies may be a preferable policy choice
because they can be a more efficient form of public finance than traditional tax and transfer);
Ricks, supra note 278, at 772–73 (proposing that a regulatory subsidy in the form of administrative
controls on bank deposit rates would provide an efficient means of addressing efficacy and
distribution issues); see also Posner, supra note 279, at 535 (stating that federal antitrust laws
prohibiting exclusionary practices are inefficient because the laws are overbroad and enforcement
is too costly).
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canceling service on the grounds that a route was not profitable.282 In
the twentieth century, the Interstate Commerce Commission gained
the authority to regulate railroads, including the power to directly
regulate rates.283 It used this power to mandate that railroads provide
service on high-cost routes at unprofitable prices.284 Motor carriers—
bus and trucking companies—found themselves subject to similar
universal service mandates, with profitable routes subsidizing more
remote routes.285 Finally, in its early years the airline industry had its
rates and routes regulated. The federal government awarded airlines a
mix of profitable and unprofitable routes, allowing the airlines to
subsidize otherwise unprofitable service to rural parts of the United
States with the fares charged on more profitable routes.286 When the
federal government backed off these universal service mandates,
Congress provided money for direct subsidies to encourage
transportation carriers to continue service to rural areas.287 Not
surprisingly, carriers began to drop service on unprofitable routes.288
Direct subsidies failed to stem the tide of rural retrenchment.289 The
result has been the well-documented isolation of rural communities.290
282. See KEELER, supra note 142, at 20–21.
283. See Hepburn Act of 1906, ch. 3591, 34 Stat. 584 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 49 U.S.C.).
284. KEELER, supra note 282, at 25.
285. Motor Carrier Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-255, 49 Stat. 543 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.); Ricks, supra note 278, at 845.
286. See STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 213, 332 (1982).
287. See Essential Air Service, supra note 134 (“The Essential Air Service (EAS) program was
put into place to guarantee that small communities that were served by certificated air carriers
before airline deregulation maintain a minimal level of scheduled air service.”); History and
Mission, supra note 143 (providing funding to establish and maintain transit systems in
communities with populations under fifty thousand).
288. See Goetz & Vowles, supra note 133, at 261 (concluding that airline deregulation has
negatively impacted fares and service available to smaller cities and unprofitable shorter-haul
routes); Longman & Khan, supra note 133, at 20–21 (discussing a loss of airline service to several
cities and attributing the loss to airline deregulation).
289. See Paul W. Barkley, The Effects of Deregulation on Rural Communities, 70 AM. J. AGRIC.
ECON. 1091, 1093–95 (1988) (summarizing deregulation of rail transport, telecommunications,
financial institutions, and natural gas as well as the negative impact each had on service in rural
areas); Paul Stephen Dempsey, The Dark Side of Deregulation: Its Impact on Small Communities,
39 ADMIN. L. REV. 445, 452–53 (2013) (explaining that legislation and broad discretion exercised
by agencies allowed private transportation providers to cancel service to rural areas when it was
unprofitable to provide).
290. See, e.g., Ben Kidder, The Challenges of Rural Transportation, W. RURAL DEV. CTR. 3–4
(2006),
https://wrdc.usu.edu/files-ou/publications/pub__9373753.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8A3MH6JG]; Steve Lockwood, Transportation in Rural America: Challenges and Opportunities, U.
MINN.
(2004),
http://www.cts.umn.edu/sites/default/files/files/events/oberstar/2004/
2004lockwoodpaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/T36D-2C4Y]; Lilly Shoup & Becca Homa, Principles for
Improving Transportation Options in Rural and Small Town Communities, TRANSP. FOR AM. (Mar.
2010), http://t4america.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/03/T4-Whitepaper-Rural-and-Small-TownCommunities.pdf [https://perma.cc/97AE-T78D].
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The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (“ACA”)
offers another example. The ACA effectively required insurance
companies to provide coverage to expensive healthcare consumers, such
as people with preexisting health conditions, at below cost. In turn, the
ACA required that most individuals, including healthy individuals not
likely to need healthcare services, purchase or otherwise acquire an
insurance policy—the so-called “individual mandate.”291 The individual
mandate represented a regulatory subsidy. Insurance companies
charged healthy individuals more than the cost of serving them so that
those who required expensive healthcare services could be served below
cost.292 In late 2017, however, Congress repealed the individual
mandate, leaving the ACA’s direct subsidies to do the work of ensuring
universal access to healthcare.293 The Congressional Budget Office
estimated that this decision would cause enrollment in healthcare to
drop by four million people by 2019 and lead to a premium hike of about
10% a year over the course of a decade.294
A broader test of the Misalignment Thesis in these or other issue
areas is beyond the scope of this Article. But the examples are
suggestive and such testing is feasible in future research. The rampant
use of regulatory subsidies in the U.S. economy, and the deregulation
of some but not all industries, provide variation in the degree of
alignment—the independent variable in the study. If we observe an
erosion of one policy plank following the introduction of misaligned
lawmaking—in particular, if the policy subject to more frequent and
costlier renegotiation and implementation suffers following the
introduction of misalignment—across a number of policy areas, that
would be a powerful indicator of the Misalignment Thesis’s explanatory
power.

291. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1501, 124 Stat. 119,
242–50 (2010) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 5000A, 42 U.S.C. § 18091 (2012)).
292. The regulation of other insurance markets also involves regulatory subsidies. For
instance, regulation of flood insurance rates that kept rates artificially low provided a significant
subsidy to homeowners living in flood plains and low-lying coastal areas. See Implementation of
the Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Hous. &
Ins. of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 113th Cong. (2013) (statement of Craig Fugate, Administrator
of FEMA).
293. Sy Mukherjee, The GOP Tax Bill Repeals Obamacare’s Individual Mandate. Here’s What
that Means for You, FORTUNE (Dec. 20, 2017), https://fortune.com/2017/12/20/tax-bill-individualmandate-obamacare/ [https://perma.cc/43T5-EW9X]; see Alex Ghenis, The Three Pillars of the
Affordable Care Act, NEW MOBILITY (Mar. 1, 2017), http://www.newmobility.com/2017/03/thethree-pillars-of-the-affordable-care-act/ [https://perma.cc/M6DM-BKNM] (describing the ACA’s
direct subsidies).
294. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, REPEALING THE INDIVIDUAL HEALTH INSURANCE MANDATE: AN
UPDATED
ESTIMATE
1
(2017),
https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/115th-congress-20172018/reports/53300-individualmandate.pdf [https://perma.cc/XJH4-WBM7].
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CONCLUSION
Trade liberalization and adjustment policies go hand in hand.
The latter represent a commitment by society to help those who suffer
from trade liberalization. Equally importantly, they ensure that those
who are harmed by trade liberalization have something to gain from it.
Yet as our current political moment demonstrates, adjustment policies
have not been adequate to preserve political support for trade
liberalization and all the benefits it brings.
This mismatch is not purely a creature of politics. It finds its
origins in a legal system that enshrines trade liberalization
commitments in international agreements and domestic statutes that
continue in perpetuity, while adjustment policies must constantly be
renegotiated. Rebuilding support for free trade thus requires thinking
of new ways to align bargaining over adjustment policies and trade
liberalization. Only if those who stand to lose from trade liberalization
nevertheless feel invested in the system can we hope to preserve the
great gains of an open-world economy.

